10.6084/m9.figshare.1397454.v2
Pedro Riera
Pedro
Riera
Economy, Type of Government, and Strategic Timing of Elections: Calling Opportunistic Early Elections in OECD Democracies
Taylor & Francis Group
2015
inflation rates
democracy governments
OECD Democracies
majority governments
Development democracies
Economic Cooperation
economy
21 Organisation
Strategic Timing
election date
mainstream models
election
2015-10-08 10:07:53
Journal contribution
https://tandf.figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Economy_Type_of_Government_and_Strategic_Timing_of_Elections_Calling_Opportunistic_Early_Elections_in_OECD_Democracies/1397454
<div><p>Although mainstream models of accountability assume that the election date is exogenously fixed, in almost any parliamentary democracy governments may choose it. This article proposes a theory of the strategic timing of elections that highlights the role of the economy and the type of government. First, incumbents will call early elections when the economy is growing and inflation rates are low. Nevertheless, coalition and majority governments will fall short of the ability and the incentives to do so, respectively. As a result, the effect of the state of the economy on the opportunistic dissolution of the parliament will be stronger when there is only one party in government, and it lacks a majority in the lower house. These patterns are examined by using data from 21 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development democracies between 1945 and 2010.</p></div>