## Online Supplement to Risk-Sensitive Control of Branching Processes by Pelin G. Canbolat Risk-Seeking Exponential Utility and Power Utility

In this supplement, we extend the results obtained for risk-averse exponential utility in the paper titled *Risk-Sensitive Control of Branching Processes* to risk-seeking exponential utility and to (risk-averse and risk-seeking) power utility with multiplicative rewards. To start with, we express the risk-seeking exponential utility of a reward w as  $u(w) = e^{\lambda w}$  for some parameter  $\lambda > 0$  and define the *utility operator*  $\mathcal{T}_a$  of action a as

$$\mathcal{T}_a U = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} q(x|a) e^{\lambda r(x,a)} U^x,$$

for any scalar  $U \ge 0$  (with  $U^0 = 1$  for  $U \ge 0$ ). Theorem 1 of the main paper remains valid after replacing  $\mathcal{D}_a$  by  $\mathcal{T}_a$ , and the expected disutility  $C_a$  by the expected utility  $U_a$ .

We define the *optimal utility operator*  $\mathcal{T}$  as

$$\mathcal{T}U = \max_{a \in A} \left\{ \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} q(x|a) e^{\lambda r(x,a)} U^x \right\},\$$

for  $U \ge 0$ . Like the optimal disutility operator  $\mathcal{D}$ , the optimal utility operator  $\mathcal{T}$  is continuous and increasing. The following theorem is the risk-seeking counterpart of Theorem 2 of the main paper.

**Theorem 5.** The maximum expected N-period utility  $\mathcal{T}^N 1$  converges monotonically to  $0 \leq U = \sup_{\pi \in A^{\infty}} U_{\pi}$  where  $A^{\infty} = \{(a_n)_{n \geq 1} : a_n \in A\}$ . If  $U < \infty$ , then there exists a stationary maximumexpected-utility policy  $\pi^* = (a_n)_{n \geq 1}$  with  $a_n = a^*$  for all  $n \geq 1$  and  $a^* \in A$  such that  $U = \mathcal{T}_{a^*}U$ .

**Proof.** The optimal-utility operator  $\mathcal{T}$  is increasing, implying that either  $\mathcal{T}1 \leq 1$  and  $\mathcal{T}^N 1$  converges down to U < 1, or  $\mathcal{T}1 > 1$  converges up to  $U \geq 1$ . Since  $\mathcal{T}^N 1 \geq 0$  for every  $N, U \geq 0$  in both cases. Also,  $\mathcal{T}^N 1 \geq U_{\pi}^N$  for all  $\pi$ , taking limit superior of both sides ensures that  $U \geq U_{\pi}$  for all  $\pi$ . Now suppose  $U < \infty$ . The finiteness of the action set guarantees the existence of  $a^* \in A$  with  $U = \mathcal{T}_{a^*}U$ . As  $U \geq U_{\pi}$  for all  $\pi, U \geq U_{a^*}$ .

If  $U \leq 1$ , then  $U = \mathcal{T}_{a^*}^N U \leq \mathcal{T}_{a^*}^N 1$  and taking limit gives  $U \leq U_{a^*}$ , hence  $U = U_{a^*}$ . On the other hand, if U > 1, then  $\mathcal{T}1 > 1$  and U is the least of the fixed points of  $\mathcal{T}$  that are greater than or equal to 1. To see why the latter statement holds, first note that the continuity of  $\mathcal{T}$  implies that  $U = \mathcal{T}U$ ; secondly, for any other fixed point  $U' \geq 1$ , the monotonicity of  $\mathcal{T}$  implies  $\mathcal{T}^N 1 \leq \mathcal{T}^N U'$ , and taking limit of both sides leads to  $U \leq U'$ . The optimal utility operator  $\mathcal{T}$  is maximum of polynomials with nonnegative coefficients, so it is convex on  $(0, \infty)$ . The function  $\mathcal{T}V - V$  must be positive and decreasing on the interval [1, U), since  $\mathcal{T}1 - 1 > 0 = \mathcal{T}U - U$  and U is the smallest value greater than one satisfying  $\mathcal{T}V - V = 0$ . Then for a sufficiently small  $\epsilon > 0$ ,  $\mathcal{T}V = \mathcal{T}_{a^*}V$  for all  $V \in [U - \epsilon, U]$ , so  $\mathcal{T}_{a^*}V - V$  is positive and decreasing on the interval  $[U - \epsilon, U)$ . The convexity of  $\mathcal{T}_{a^*}$  implies  $\mathcal{T}_{a^*}V - V > 0$  for all V < U. Hence U must be the smallest nonnegative fixed point of  $\mathcal{T}_{a^*}$  and is greater than 1, so  $U_{a^*} = U$ .  $\Box$ 

The results with risk-seeking exponential utility allow extending the theory to power utility functions. To show this, we consider the power utility function  $u(w) = w^{\lambda}$  with parameter  $\lambda > 0$ for w > 0 and multiplicative rewards such that the reward collected over periods n = 1, ..., N is

$$\prod_{n=1}^{N} \prod_{k=1}^{Z_n} r(X_{n+1}^k, \pi_n^k),$$

where  $\pi_n^k$  represents the action assigned to individual k in period n. The expected power utility of these rewards given the initial population size  $Z_1 = z$  is then

$$U_{\pi}^{N}(z) = \mathbf{E}\left[\left(\prod_{n=1}^{N}\prod_{k=1}^{Z_{n}}r(X_{n+1}^{k},\pi_{n}^{k})\right)^{\lambda} \mid Z_{1} = z,\pi\right] = \mathbf{E}\left[e^{\lambda\sum_{n=1}^{N}\sum_{k=1}^{Z_{n}}\ln r(X_{n+1}^{k},\pi_{n}^{k})} \mid Z_{1} = z,\pi\right],$$

meaning that the expected power utility of multiplicative rewards equals the expected risk-seeking exponential utility of additive logarithmic rewards. Consequently, we can apply the results stated in this section to the problem with power utility.