

Online Appendix of Politicizing Europe in times of crisis
by Swen Hutter and Hanspeter Kriesi, Journal of European Public Policy

Appendix A: Coding and issue categorization

Table A.1: List of countries and elections

Country	Election year
Austria	2006, 2008, 2013
France	2007, 2012
Germany	2005, 2009, 2013
Greece	2007, 2009, 2012 May & June, 2015 Jan & Sept
Hungary	2006, 2010, 2014
Ireland	2007, 2011, 2016
Italy	2006, 2008, 2013
Latvia	2006, 2010, 2011, 2014
Netherlands	2003, 2006, 2010, 2012
Poland	2007, 2011, 2015
Portugal	2005, 2009, 2011, 2015
Romania	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Spain	2004, 2008, 2011, 2015
Switzerland	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
UK	2005, 2010, 2015

Note: Apart from France, we always study the national parliamentary elections.

Table A.2: List of newspapers and number of actor-issue sentences

Country	Newspapers	No. of actor-issue statements
Austria	Die Presse, Kronenzeitung	5,523
France	Le Monde, Le Parisien	3,297
Germany	Süddeutsche Zeitung, Bild	5,032
Greece	Ta Nea, Kathimerini	6,853
Hungary	Népszabadság, Magyar Nemzet	3,545
Ireland	The Irish Times, The Sun (Irish edition)	6,853
Italy	La Repubblica, Corriere della Sera	3,845
Latvia	Latvijas Avīze, Diena*	5,278
Netherlands	NRC Handelsblad, Algemeen Dagblad	5,605
Poland	Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita	3,456
Portugal	Público, Diário de Notícias	4,575
Romania	Jurnalul National, Adevarul	4,996
Spain	El Mundo, El Pais	4,120
Switzerland	Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Blick	5,343
UK	The Times, The Sun	5,670
Total		73,829

Note: In the case of Northwestern Europe, we selected the major quality and tabloid newspapers in a country. Given the more polarized media systems, we selected one newspaper from the center-left and one from the center-right for Southern and Central-Eastern European countries. Usually, we focused on the period two months before Election Day. In the case of early, we coded the period in-between the official announcement of the election date and the Election Day.

Table A.3: Issue categories

Categories	Description (a position of +1 stands for ...)
Europe	support for European integration in general, deepening and widening (except European common currency)
Euro	support for the common European currency; opposition to a country leaving the Eurozone; opposition to the bail-out and its conditions (e.g., support for better interest rates, debt restructuring)
welfare	support for an expansion of the welfare state; objection to welfare state retrenchment; support for tax reforms with a redistributive character; calls for employment and health care programs
economic liberalism	opposition to market regulation, economic protectionism in agriculture and other sectors of the economy; support for deregulation, more competition, and privatization; support for a rigid budgetary policy; reduction of the state deficit and taxes without direct redistributive effects
economic reform (vague)	support for general economic reforms without clear direction (e.g., fighting economic crisis; fighting unemployment)
education	support for education and research
infrastructure	support for improving the country's roads, railways, and other physical infrastructure; support for media
democratic renewal	support for institutional reforms to make political system more democratic or transparent; opposition to corruption and political class; fair and equal access to media
democratic reform (vague)	support for general reforms of the political system without clear direction
regionalism	support for regional autonomy or independence
cultural liberalism	support for cultural diversity, international cooperation, gender equality, homosexuals; opposition to national traditions and traditional moral values.
immigration	opposition to restrictive immigration and integration policies
nationalism	support for nationalist ideas; opposition to rights of ethnic minorities (e.g., Roma, Russians in Latvia)
historical legacy	condemning communist or fascist past
environment	support for environmental protection; opposition to nuclear energy
security	support for more law and order, fighting crime
defense	support for military interventions, the armed forces, a strong national defense, and nuclear weapons

Coding

As stated, we selected articles from two newspapers per country (see Table A.2). We selected all news articles that were published within two months before the national Election Day and reported on the electoral contest and national party politics more generally. In the case of early elections, we selected the period from the announcement of the election until the Election Day. Editorials and commentaries were excluded from the selection. The selection was done by an extensive keyword list including the names and abbreviations of political parties and key politicians from each party.

We then coded a sample of the selected articles using core sentence analysis (CSA). Following this type of relational content analysis, each grammatical sentence of an article is reduced to its most basic ‘core sentence(s)’ structure, which contain(s) only the subject, the object, and the direction of the relationship between the two. The core sentence approach was developed by Kleinnijenhuis and colleagues (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis, et al., 1997) and further refined for the study of political conflict by Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012).¹ This type of quantitative content analysis allows us to study both issue positions and salience. The direction between actors and issues is quantified using a scale ranging from -1 to +1, with three intermediary positions. For example, the grammatical sentence “Party leader A rejects calls for leaving the Eurozone but supports a haircut on the country’s debt” leads to two coded observations (Party A +1 Eurozone membership; Party A +1 haircut). For this paper, we only focus on relations between party actors and political issues, that is we neglect relations between different actors (on the number of cases, see Table A.2).

Media data

While media data come with biases, we think they offer ample opportunities to capture changes in the political space in times of crises. More precisely, we rely on media data because we are interested in *publicly* visible conflicts among the parties during the campaigns. In our opinion, media data are especially sensitive to political change and allow us to examine how the issues of the day map onto underlying issue dimensions. While this might lead to limited information about small parties (as they might be underreported in the media), it gives a good indication of the conflicts and actors that dominate the public debate. Alternative data sources do not come with the same biases. However, they are usually not linked to specific elections (especially expert surveys), do not contain positional and salience measure for all issues (especially manifesto data), and apply a rather rigid issue set of issue categories (which we tend to avoid by relying on a more inductive approach to new issues).

Hutter and Gessler (2019) cross-validated the media-based data for the fifteen countries used in this article by comparing it with the well-known data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP/Marpor) (Volkens et al. 2017). In line with previous results from Helbling and Tresch (2011), they find that the CSA data used in this article represent party positions in an accurate way. That is, the results indicate very high convergence when comparing CSA and CMP data. Note that the correlation coefficients are as high as those from similar comparisons of CMP and expert data. Second, the CSA data converge with the CMP data regarding the level of salience *across* the various issue domains. However, they tend to capture a different dynamic regarding *within-issue* variation (both across countries and over-time). This can be interpreted as indicating that media-based data do capture a different agenda to that captured from direct party communications or expert surveys because

¹ For more extended methodological discussions, see the methods’ chapters in the two books by Dolezal (2008) and Dolezal et al. (2012).

of the media filter, campaign dynamics (including inter- and intra-party conflict) and external events (such as an economic crisis). From the point of view of the public debate and electoral campaigns' influence on citizens, it seems fair to conclude that it is exactly this agenda represented in the media that is crucial.

Reliability

The coders were trained in several common and individual meetings, and they had to code the same ten English-speaking articles with sufficient accurateness before starting the actual coding. Moreover, we conducted a reliability test in the early phase of the coding. As in the case of related approaches, the coders disagreed slightly more often on the identification of the relevant coding units (i.e., the core sentences) than on the actual coding of specific variables – especially if we focus on the comparatively high aggregation levels of actors and issues used for the analyses in this book. But note that in a recent methodological study, Dolezal et al. (2016) illustrate the advantages of core sentences as coding unit compared to approaches that either rely on so-called quasi-sentences (the approach of the Comparative Manifesto Project) or take grammatical sentences as coding units (e.g., Däubler et al. 2012). Mirroring the results from previous projects (see Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012), in the first reliability tests we obtained a coder agreement of a bit below 80 percent with respect to the identification of the core sentences (Cohen's Kappa=0.76). Additional coder training and continuous monitoring during the coding process were provided to address remaining uncertainties and to increase the reliability coefficient above the typical acceptance level of 0.80. The reliability coefficients for all the variables analyzed (at the aggregation level presented in the present study) were also clearly above this threshold (>0.90 for the most aggregated issue domains and party affiliations).

Systemic politicization (systemic salience X polarization)

We operationalize the two components of politicization as follows: *salience* is measured by the share of core sentences on an issue category in percent of all sentences related to any issue. The indicator for the *polarization* of party positions is based on Taylor and Hermann's (1971) index, which was originally designed to measure left-right polarization in a party system. The polarization of positions on a given issue category is computed as follow:

$$\text{Polarization} = \sum_{k=1}^K \omega_k (x_k - \bar{x})^2,$$

where ω_k is the salience of a particular issue category for party k, x_k is the position of party k on this issue category, and \bar{x} is the *weighted average position of all parties*, where weights are provided by the party-specific salience of the issue. Since positions are always measured on scales ranging from -1 to +1, the distance to the average (and our measure of polarization) can range between 0 and 1.

Multidimensional scaling

While the politicization measure already indicates which issues or issue domains divide parties in a spatial sense, they do not indicate which issues are embedded in the same broader dimensions that structure the political space. Moreover, the four broad issue domains share a weakness with a lot of the literature in party competition. That is, they assume a certain alignment of issue positions related to economic versus cultural (or GAL/TAN, authoritarian-libertarian, etc.) concerns. To avoid such apriori classifications and to tackle the problem of

the relatively high number of issues but small numbers of actors, we follow Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) and construct the spaces based on the coded issue statements with the help of multi-dimensional scaling (MDS). MDS allows for graphical representations of the location of parties and issues in a common low-dimensional space. It helps to identify whether and how conflicts over different issues map onto some underlying dimensions.

MDS is a very flexible method, quite similar to factor analysis, which allows for a graphic representation of similarities or dissimilarities between pairs of objects. More specifically, we rely on a variant of MDS called weighted metric multidimensional scaling (WMMDS). MDS locates the objects in a space while keeping the distances between them as close as possible to the original proximities. However, as the aim is to obtain a representation of the objects in a low dimensional space, some distortion of the original distances is unavoidable. The rationale for the use of weights is that not all relations between parties and issues have the same importance.² In a campaign, parties address some issues very frequently while other issues play a minor role in their statements. Similarly, not all parties are central actors in a campaign. We account for such variation by computing weights that reflect the salience of a given party for a given issue. These weights are calculated as the number of core sentences corresponding to a given party-issue relationship, expressed as a proportion of the total number of relationships between parties and issues. Moreover, for the calculation of the regional MDS plots presented in this paper, each country gets the same weight on the configuration.

As in any spatial analysis, it is important to note that the focus on dimensions comes at the expense of details. That is, MDS allows identifying the main lines of conflict in the party system like under a magnifying glass. The trade-off is that less salient issues and actors are less accurately represented. It is also important to note that MDS configurations can only be interpreted regarding distances between objects. The orientation of a configuration is arbitrary, which implies that it can be freely rotated. To facilitate comparison of the spaces shown, we have rotated them in such a way that the issues ‘welfare’ and ‘economic liberalism’ are situated on a horizontal line. To focus attention on those aspects of these configurations that are most important given our hypotheses, we have drawn a line connecting welfare and economic liberalism as the supposed endpoints of the economic left-right divide and another line connecting the supposed endpoints of the second non-economic dimension.

² The degree of distortion is measured by a ‘Stress’ statistic, which is based on the sum of the squared distances between the original proximities and the proximities obtained in the solution. The higher the value of the Stress statistic, the worse is the fit between the solution and the data. The aim is thus to find the solution that minimizes the value of Stress. In our case, we want to obtain a configuration of parties and issues where the distances between them are as close as possible to those in our original data. By using weights, we allow for the possibility that some distortions of original distances have a larger impact on the value of Stress than others. In other words, we give much importance to representing some distances faithfully and less importance to the degree of distortion affecting other distances.


Appendix B: Benchmark and cross-country variations in politicization

Table B.1: Benchmarks for systemic measures

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Salience	6.10	6.82	0.05	52.2
Polarization	0.14	0.18	0.00	0.99
Politicization	1.10	1.88	0.00	22.66

Note: The benchmark is based on the calculation of systemic salience, polarization, and politicization for a set of 17 issue categories in electoral campaigns covered by the current study (15 European countries, 2003-2017) (N=889).

Figure B.1: Systemic politicization of European integration (trends by macro region)



Note: The figure shows the politicization (salience X polarization) by election campaign. The trends for each macro region are based on locally weighted smoothing (LOWESS).

Table B.2: Systemic politicization by country and period

	Overall			Euro only	
	<=2008	>2008	>07/2015	pre-crisis	crisis
Greece	0.37	11.29	11,03	-	7.96
Netherlands	0.46	3.60	3,49	-	1.92
France	0.41	2.77	4,67	-	0.63
Portugal	0.97	2.71	2,47	0.96	2.70
Britain	0.36	2.70	4,17	0.36	0.22
Italy	0.62	2.32	n,a,	-	0.73
Austria	1.78	2.28	3,50	-	0.08
Poland	0.14	1.41	0,65	-	-
Ireland	-	1.12	0,91	-	0.90
Switzerland	2.52	0.97	1,38	-	-
Germany	2.57	0.77	1,02	-	0.55
Romania	-	0.75	-	-	-
Spain	-	0.63	0,42	-	0.52
Latvia	0.61	0.18	n,a,	-	0.06
Hungary	0.64	0.03	n,a,	-	-
<i>Average</i>	0.76	2.24	2.81	0.09	1.08

Note: The table shows the average level of politicization by country and period (pre/post-2008). Values above the ‘mean’ benchmark based on all other issues are highlighted in bold. The first two columns show the overall politicization of European integration, whereas the last two columns show the values related to the sub-category ‘Euro’ only (see methods’ section).

Appendix C: Regression analysis and robustness checks (party-level analysis)

Table C.1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Politicizing party score	-0.01	0.11	-0.69	0.41
Systemic context	0.00	0.03	-0.13	0.11
Center left	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
Center right	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
Radical left	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Radical right	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
Government (=1)	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Vote share	15.20	12.41	0.00	52.73

Note: The descriptive statistics refer to the variables used for the regression analysis (N=347; see Table 2 in main text)

In Table C.2, we report the detailed results of the regression analysis as discussed in the main text of the article. We ran OLS regressions with clustered standard errors.

Table C.2: The impact of party families and strategic factors on the ‘politicizing party’ score

	Party families	Strategy	Both	NWE only	SE only	CEE only
Systemic context (<i>anti- to pro-Europe</i>)	-0.966* (-2.560)	-1.176** (-2.840)	-0.928** (-3.080)	-0.434** (-2.963)	-1.283+ (-1.978)	-0.470*** (-3.496)
Center right (<i>center left=ref.</i>)	-0.005 (-0.667)		-0.008 (-0.883)	-0.028*** (-3.405)	0.003 (0.155)	0.007 (1.069)
Radical left	-0.103*** (-4.672)		-0.106*** (-4.003)	-0.076** (-3.018)	-0.139*** (-3.403)	0.003 (0.470)
Radical right	-0.079*** (-4.343)		-0.084*** (-5.147)	-0.087*** (-7.349)	-0.179* (-2.545)	0.001 (0.265)
Government		0.036*** (3.725)	0.023* (2.327)	0.013 (1.452)	0.053* (2.062)	0.008 (1.384)
Vote share		0.000 (0.164)	-0.001* (-2.044)	-0.001** (-2.744)	-0.001 (-1.349)	0.000 (0.348)
Constant	0.024*** (4.424)	-0.018+ (-1.925)	0.031*** (3.658)	0.044*** (4.787)	0.029 (1.114)	-0.005 (-0.707)
N	347	347	347	144	117	86
r2	0.241	0.115	0.254	0.352	0.344	0.121

t statistics in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Negative values of the dependent variable indicate that a party emphasizes a more critical position towards European integration than its competitors, while positive values indicate that a party emphasizes a more positive position. Likewise, the systemic context measure used here indicates to what extent the competitors in the system emphasize negative or positive positions towards Europe (systemic salience X systemic position; excluding party in question). The results shown are based on OLS regressions with robust standard errors (including country dummies does not affect the results). In addition, Appendix A shows the results of a robustness test based on Prais-Winsten regressions which account for the panel structure of the dataset.

To account for the panel structure of our dataset, we also relied on Prais-Winsten estimations. We also ran separate models excluding the Greek cases given the extraordinarily elevated levels of politicization in the Greek ‘crisis’ campaigns and the fact that 17 of the 19 high-leverage observations (identified by Cook’s distance measure) are from Greece. Both tests provide very similar results which strengthens our belief in the robustness of the results presented in the main text of the paper. Note also that adding country dummies does not change any of the reported results.

Table C.3: The impact of party groups and strategic factors on the ‘politicizing party’ score (Prais-Winsten estimations)

	Party families	Strategy	Both	NWE only	SE only	CEE only
Systemic context (<i>anti- to pro-Europe</i>)	-0.712** (-2.654)	-0.658* (-2.345)	-0.669* (-2.451)	-0.417** (-2.992)	-1.017* (-2.052)	-0.440*** (-3.680)
Center right (<i>center left=ref.</i>)	-0.008 (-0.929)		-0.010 (-1.219)	-0.028*** (-3.712)	-0.003 (-0.155)	0.006 (0.877)
Radical left	-0.095*** (-3.848)		-0.098*** (-4.068)	-0.075** (-3.344)	-0.143*** (-3.822)	0.003 (0.412)
Radical right	-0.077*** (-5.200)		-0.082*** (-5.272)	-0.087*** (-8.312)	-0.184*** (-4.405)	0.001 (0.150)
Government		0.025* -2.168	0.020+ -1.935	0.011 (1.015)	0.047+ (1.844)	0.007 (1.004)
Vote share		0.000 (-0.414)	-0.001* (-2.078)	-0.001* (-2.428)	-0.001 (-1.330)	0.000 (0.375)
Constant	0.025*** -4.631	-0.009 (-0.854)	0.033*** -3.836	0.044*** (4.859)	0.038+ (1.746)	-0.004 (-0.667)
N	347	347	347	144	117	86
r2	0.151	0.050	0.165	0.327	0.262	0.102

t statistics in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure C.1: Marginal effects of the ‘politicizing party’ score by region, party type, and period (Prais-Winsten estimations) (same as Figure 2 in main text)





Table C.4: The impact of party groups and strategic factors on the ‘politicizing party’ score (excluding Greece)

	Party families	Strategy	Both	SE only
Systemic politicization (<i>anti- to pro-Europe</i>)	-0.624*** (-4.721)	-0.760*** (-4.694)	-0.604*** (-4.807)	-1.686** (-2.965)
Center right (<i>center left=ref.</i>)	-0.009+ (-1.752)		-0.009+ (-1.661)	0.013+ (1.710)
Radical left	-0.050*** (-4.375)		-0.053*** (-4.221)	-0.034* (-2.575)
Radical right	-0.055*** (-6.020)		-0.057*** (-5.685)	-0.026 (-1.542)
Government		0.012* (2.266)	0.008+ (1.674)	0.002 (0.227)
Vote share		0.000 (0.011)	-0.001* (-2.236)	0.000 (0.510)
Constant	0.017*** (4.387)	-0.004 (-0.770)	0.023*** (3.556)	-0.006 (-0.785)
N	307	307	307	77
r2	0.236	0.089	0.248	0.385

t statistics in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure C.2: Marginal effects of the ‘politicizing party’ score by region, party type, and period (excluding Greece) (same as Figure 2 in main text)



We present additional plots based on two-way interactions instead of separate models by region as presented in the main text.

Figure C.3: Marginal effects of the ‘politicizing party’ score by region and party type





Figure C.4: Marginal effects of the ‘politicizing party’ score by region and government status



We also ran the regressions separately for the two sub-categories ‘Europe’ and ‘Euro.’


Table C.5: The impact of party groups and strategic factors on the ‘politicizing party’ score (for the two sub-issues)

	Europe w/o Euro			Euro only		
	Party families	Strategy	Both	Party families	Strategy	Both
Systemic mood (<i>anti- to pro-Europe</i>)	-1.152* (-2.403)	-1.304* (-2.497)	-1.139 (-1.555)	-1.282* (-2.304)	-1.432* (-2.424)	-1.263** (-2.776)
Center right (<i>center left=ref.</i>)	-0.010+ (-1.772)		-0.011+ (-1.703)	0.002 (0.314)		-0.001 (-0.123)
Radical left	-0.051*** (-4.236)		-0.051* (-2.413)	-0.074*** (-3.797)		-0.074*** (-3.559)
Radical right	-0.047*** (-4.892)		-0.049*** (-5.496)	-0.041** (-2.620)		-0.043** (-2.799)
Government		0.016** (2.873)	0.011* (2.085)		0.026** (3.238)	0.015+ (1.725)
Vote share		0.000 (0.339)	-0.000 (-1.217)		0.000 (0.629)	-0.000 (-1.085)
Constant	0.023*** (5.245)	-0.000 (-0.037)	0.026*** (4.060)	0.005 (1.373)	-0.024** (-3.257)	0.008 (1.200)
N	347	347	347	347	347	347
r2	0.217	0.140	0.223	0.214	0.128	0.221

t statistics in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure C.5: Marginal effects of the ‘politicizing party’ score by region, party type, and period (for the two sub-issues) (same as Figure 2 in main text)



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