Online Appendix:

**When Shifting Backfires:**

The Electoral Consequences of Responding to Niche Party EU Positions

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**Robustness Checks**

The Eurobarometer survey item which asks individuals if they believe their country’s membership of the EU is a “good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad” is available for 1979 to Spring 2010. Autumn 2010 onwards, the Eurobarometer survey series asked if individuals have a “very positive, somewhat positive, neutral, somewhat negative, or very negative” view of the EU. To get a full time-series, our measure of public Euroscepticism relies on both items by combining all “negatives”. Importantly, when the data is restricted to 1979 to 2009, the results are similar to the results in the main models of this study (see Table A.6). Models using a contemporaneous measure of public Euroscepticism showed nearly identical results to the lagged approach. Bayesian Information Criterion suggests models using lagged public Euroscepticism fit better (see Table A.7).

It is possible that a radical right party is not necessarily an anti-EU party. It is not necessary that a radical right party be anti-EU in absolute terms, as long as the radical right party is more Eurosceptic than the mainstream party in an observation. In a few observations the radical right party is not more Eurosceptic than a mainstream party (these tend to be observations including minor mainstream parties such as the Italian *Lista Lavoro e Libertà* in 2013). We ran the main models of this study restricting the data to only those observations in which the radical right party is more Eurosceptic than the mainstream party. The results of these tests (see Models A12 through A15 in Table A.10 of the appendix) are similar to the main models of this study.

As a robustness check, we have also estimated models (see Table A.9 in the appendix) in which the main independent variable was an interaction between mainstream party shift towards Euroscepticism and radical left party success (defining radical left parties as parties that are coded as “socialist” in the CMP data). Marginal effects plots of these tests are reported in Figures A.1 (the entire sample), A.2 (restricting data to centre-right parties), and A.3 (restricting data to centre-left parties). When the entire sample is considered (Figure A.1), a mainstream party shift towards Euroscepticism in the face of a more successful radical left party results in increased vote share for the mainstream party – but only for a handful of cases. Figure A.2 suggests no clear effects when the sample includes only centre-right mainstream parties. Figure A.3 shows a positive effect when the sample includes only centre-left mainstream parties. This effect, however, is only found for a handful of observations when radical left party vote share is extremely high.

**Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for Models 1 and 2 (Full Sample)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **N** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Min.** | **Max.** |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share | 192 | 17.537 | 12.923 | 0 | 67.880 |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share*t-1* | 192 | 18.729 | 13.326 | 0 | 67.880 |
| ∆ MS Euroscepticism*t* | 192 | 0.091 | 1.584 | -3.789 | 5.944 |
| Radical right Vote Share*t-1* | 192 | 9.367 | 6.241 | 0 | 26.910 |
| ∆ MS Euroscepticism*t\** Radical Right Vote Share*t-1* | 192 | 1.520 | 18.809 | -59.084 | 66.834 |
| Member of Cabinet | 192 | 0.411 | 0.493 | 0 | 1.000 |
| GDP/Capita *t* | 192 | 27935.12 | 14450.92 | 6967.228 | 61753.66 |
| MS Right-Left Position | 192 | 0.104 | 0.722 | -1.578 | 2.752 |
| Single Currency Dummy | 192 | 0.453 | 0.499 | 0 | 1.000 |
| Public Euroscepticism *t-1* | 192 | 0.148 | 0.109 | 0.023 | 0.451 |
| Distance in Euroscepticism with Nearest Competitor | 192 | -0.115 | 1.201 | -6.412 | 6.412 |
| Average District Magnitude | 192 | 41.479 | 59.700 | 1 | 150 |
| ∆ in Party System Euroscepticism | 192 | 0.093 | 0.982 | -2.082 | 4.344 |
| ∆ in Party System Right-Left Position | 192 | -0.003 | 0.451 | -1.656 | 1.377 |
| Radical Left Vote Share*t-1* | 192 | 10.295 | 11.891 | 0 | 41.681 |
| Year | 192 | 2003.406 | 9.291 | 1979 | 2015 |

**Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics for Model 3 (Centre-Right Parties)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **N** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Min.** | **Max.** |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share | 100 | 16.563 | 12.331 | 0 | 44.630 |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share*t-1* | 100 | 18.479 | 13.434 | 0.95 | 67.880 |
| ∆ MS Euroscepticism*t* | 100 | 0.222 | 1.610 | -2.565 | 5.944 |
| Radical right Vote Share*t-1* | 100 | 10.059 | 6.387 | 0 | 26.910 |
| ∆ MS Euroscepticism*t\** Radical Right Vote Share*t-1* | 100 | 3.121 | 22.554 | -50.084 | 98.191 |
| Member of Cabinet | 100 | 0.420 | 0.496 | 0 | 1.000 |
| GDP/Capita *t* | 100 | 29297.56 | 13916.38 | 6967.228 | 61753.66 |
| MS Right-Left Position | 100 | 0.429 | 0.691 | -0.720 | 2.752 |
| Single Currency Dummy | 100 | 0.490 | 0.502 | 0 | 1.000 |
| Public Euroscepticism *t-1* | 100 | 0.153 | 0.105 | 0.023 | 0.451 |
| Distance in Euroscepticism with Nearest Competitor | 100 | 0.125 | 1.224 | -3.714 | 6.412 |
| Average District Magnitude | 100 | 42.841 | 60.894 | 1 | 150 |
| ∆ in Party System Euroscepticism | 100 | 0.035 | 0.928 | -2.082 | 2.500 |
| ∆ in Party System Right-Left Position | 100 | -0.008 | 0.475 | -1.656 | 1.377 |
| Radical Left Vote Share*t-1* | 100 | 9.823 | 11.127 | 0 | 41.681 |
| Year | 100 | 2004.100 | 8.368 | 1979 | 2015 |

**Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics for Models 4 (Centre-Left Parties)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **N** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Min.** | **Max.** |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share | 92 | 18.595 | 13.526 | 0 | 67.880 |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share*t-1* | 92 | 18.999 | 13.275 | 0 | 48.190 |
| ∆ MS Euroscepticism*t* | 92 | -0.052 | 1.553 | -3.789 | 3.975 |
| Radical right Vote Share*t-1* | 92 | 8.616 | 6.023 | 0 | 26.910 |
| ∆ MS Euroscepticism*t\** Radical Right Vote Share*t-1* | 92 | -0.221 | 13.536 | -35.173 | 61.312 |
| Member of Cabinet | 92 | 0.402 | 0.493 | 0 | 1.000 |
| GDP/Capita *t* | 92 | 26454.21 | 14945.34 | 6967.228 | 61753.660 |
| MS Right-Left Position | 92 | -0.250 | 0.576 | -1.578 | 1.084 |
| Single Currency Dummy | 92 | 0.413 | 0.495 | 0 | 1.000 |
| Public Euroscepticism *t-1* | 92 | 0.143 | 0.113 | 0.023 | 0.451 |
| Distance in Euroscepticism with Nearest Competitor | 92 | -0.377 | 1.126 | -6.412 | 2.393 |
| Average District Magnitude | 92 | 39.998 | 58.672 | 1 | 150 |
| ∆ in Party System Euroscepticism | 92 | 0.156 | 1.039 | -1.946 | 4.344 |
| ∆ in Party System Right-Left Position | 92 | 0.003 | 0.426 | -1.167 | 1.274 |
| Radical Left Vote Share*t-1* | 92 | 10.808 | 12.709 | 0 | 41.681 |
| Year | 92 | 2002.652 | 10.19312 | 1979 | 2015 |

**Table A.4: Liberal Party Designation as Centre-Right or Centre-Left**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Centre-Left** | **Centre-Right** |
| Austria | Liberal Forum (1994) | Liberal Forum (1995) |
| Bulgaria | . | . |
| Czech Republic | . | . |
| Denmark | . | Liberal Alliance (2011) |
| Liberals (1979-2011) | . |
| New Alliance (2007) | . |
| Radical Party (1979-1998; 2005-2007) | Radical Party (2001; 2011) |
| Estonia | Estonian Center Party (2003-2015) | . |
| Estonian Reform Party (2003-2015) | . |
| France | . | . |
| Greece | . | . |
| Hungary | Alliance of Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union - Christian Democratic People's Party (2006-2010) | Alliance of Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union - Christian Democratic People's Party (2014) |
| Alliance of Free Democrats (2002-2006) | . |
| Italy | Democratic Party (2008-2013) | . |
| Italian Liberal Party (1979) | Italian Liberal Party (1987-1992) |
| Italian Republican Party (1979-1983) | Italian Republican Party (1987-1992) |
| List Di Pietro - Italy of Values (2001-2006) | List Di Pietro - Italy of Values (2008) |
| Latvia | . | . |
| Netherlands | Livable Netherlands (2002-2003) | . |
| People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (1981-1994; 2002) | People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (1998; 2003-2012) |
| Slovakia | Freedom and Solidarity (2010) | Freedom and Solidarity (2012) |
| Slovenia | For Real (2011) | For Real (2008) |
| Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (2004) | Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (2008-2011) |
| United Kingdom | Liberal Party (1979-1987) |  |
| Liberal Democrats (1992-2001; 2010-2015) | Liberal Democrats (2005) |

*Note*: Not all of the above liberal parties are included in the analysis as it is possible that a radical right party did not exist in a country in a particular year.

**Table A.5: Effect of Mainstream Shifts on Mainstream Vote Share by Party Type**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| DV: Mainstream Party Vote Share | Model A1 |
|  | Coefficient |
|  | (SE) |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share*t-1* | -0.129(0.202) |
| **∆ MS Euroscepticism*t*** | **-0.655(0.515)** |
| **Radical right Vote Share*t-1*** | **-0.251(0.260)** |
| **∆ MS Euroscepticism*t\** Radical right Vote Share*t-1*** | **0.067(0.054)** |
| Member of Cabinet | -2.242(2.119) |
| GDP/Capita *t* | 0.0004(0.0003) |
| MS Right-Left Position | 1.445(2.184) |
| Single Currency Dummy | 4.679\*(2.552) |
| Public Euroscepticism *t-1* | -14.448(30.468) |
| Distance in Euroscepticism with Nearest Competitor | -0.731(1.817) |
| Average District Magnitude | -0.175(0.299) |
| ∆ in Party System Euroscepticism | -1.249(0.773) |
| ∆ in Party System Right-Left Position | -0.209(1.129) |
| Radical Left Vote Share*t-1* | -59.479\*\*\*(17.855) |
| Year | -0.994\*(0.549) |
| Intercept | 2016.106(1098.252) |
| N | 92 |
| Clusters | 14 |
| R2 Within | 0.481 |
| R2 Between | 0.070 |
| R2 Overall | 0.000 |
| BIC | 571.086 |

*Note*: Table entries are OLS Regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors, clustered by country, and fixed-effects. Model A1 is restricted to centre-left parties. Models without interactions for Model 3 and Model A1 can be found in Table A.8.

*\*\*\* p ≤0.01; \*\* p ≤.0.05; \* p ≤.0.10.*

**Table A.6: Effect of Mainstream Shifts on Mainstream Vote Total Restricted to 1979-2009**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DV: Mainstream Party Vote Share | Model A2 | Model A3 |
|  | Coefficient | Coefficient |
|  | (SE) | (SE) |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share*t-1* | 0.253(0.242) | 0.236(0.205) |
| **∆ MS Euroscepticism*t*** | **0.223(0.397)** | **0.877\*\*(0.346)** |
| **Radical right Vote Share*t-1*** | **0.089\*\*(0.038)** | **0.158(0.067)** |
| **∆ MS Euroscepticism*t\** Radical right Vote Share*t-1*** | **.** | **-0.079\*\*\*(0.020)** |
| Member of Cabinet | -1.064\*\*\*(0.176) | -0.419\*(0.214) |
| GDP/Capita *t* | -0.0003\*\*(0.0001) | -0.0002(0.0001) |
| MS Right-Left Position | -1.831\*(0.968) | -1.257(1.008) |
| Single Currency Dummy | 1.173(2.008) | -1.290(1.631) |
| Public Euroscepticism*t-1*  | -28.036\*(15.645) | -16.832(19.216) |
| Distance in Euroscepticism with Nearest Competitor | -0.340(1.337) | 0.044(1.272) |
| Average District Magnitude | 0.404\*\*\*(0.047) | 0.394\*\*\*(0.073) |
| ∆ in Party System Euroscepticism | 0.010(0.407) | -0.210(0.450) |
| ∆ in Party System Right-Left Position | 0.557(1.421) | 0.692(1.499) |
| Radical Left Vote Share*t-1* | 0.063(0.256) | 0.046(0.216) |
| Year | 0.232(0.289) | 0.065(0.287) |
| Intercept | -458.599(579.150) | -127.248(574.992) |
| N | 129 | 129 |
| Clusters | 14 | 14 |
| R2 Within | 0.361 | 0.397 |
| R2 Between | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| R2 Overall | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| BIC | 683.584 | 676.050 |

*Note*: The data is restricted to observations from 1979-2009 in Models A2 and A3. Table entries are OLS Regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors, clustered by country, and fixed-effects.

*\*\*\* p ≤0.01; \*\* p ≤.0.05; \* p ≤.0.10.*

**Table A.7: Effect of Mainstream Shifts on Mainstream Vote Total Including Contemporaneous Public Opinion Variable**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DV: Mainstream Party Vote Share | Model A4 | Model A5 |
|  | Coefficient | Coefficient |
|  | (SE) | (SE) |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share*t-1* | 0.136(0.182) | 0.129(0.177) |
| **∆ MS Euroscepticism*t*** | **-0.221(0.457)** | **0.391(0.458)** |
| **Radical right Vote Share*t-1*** | **-0.004(0.174)** | **-0.001(0.200)** |
| **∆ MS Euroscepticism*t\** Radical right Vote Share*t-1*** | **.** | **-0.067\*\*(0.029)** |
| Member of Cabinet | -1.358(1.714) | -1.253(1.747) |
| GDP/Capita *t* | 0.0002(0.0002) | 0.0003(0.0002) |
| MS Right-Left Position | -0.605(1.249) | -0.308(1.239) |
| Single Currency Dummy | 4.542\*\*(1.799) | 4.337\*\*(1.851) |
| Public Euroscepticism*t*  | -9.869(15.325) | -8.510(14.633) |
| Distance in Euroscepticism with Nearest Competitor | -1.314(0.765) | -1.214(0.798) |
| Average District Magnitude | 0.174(0.136) | 0.164(0.141) |
| ∆ in Party System Euroscepticism | -0.730(0.530) | -0.745(0.524) |
| ∆ in Party System Right-Left Position | -0.075(0.926) | -0.154(0.983) |
| Radical Left Vote Share*t-1* | -19.843\*(9.335) | -20.091\*(10.137) |
| Year | -0.784\*\*(0.357) | -0.809\*\*(0.327) |
| Intercept | 1574.152\*\*(715.121) | 1623.433\*\*(655.281) |
| N | 192 | 192 |
| Clusters | 14 | 14 |
| R2 Within | 0.332 | 0.345 |
| R2 Between | 0.030 | 0.036 |
| R2 Overall | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| BIC | 1174.412 | 1170.775 |

*Note*: Models A5 and A6 are identical to Models 1 and 2 of this study, however, the lagged measure of public Euroscepticism in replaced with a contemporaneous measure of public Euroscepticism. Table entries are OLS Regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors, clustered by country, and fixed-effects.

*\*\*\* p ≤0.01; \*\* p ≤.0.05; \* p ≤.0.10.*

**Table A.8: Effect of Mainstream Shifts on Mainstream Vote Share by Party Type Without Interactions**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DV: Mainstream Party Vote Share | Model A6 | Model A7 |
|  | Coefficient | Coefficient |
|  | (SE) | (SE) |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share*t-1* | 0.214(0.180) | -0.114(0.200) |
| **∆ MS Euroscepticism*t*** | **0.206(0.363)** | **-0.245(0.498)** |
| **Radical right Vote Share*t-1*** | **0.196(0.124)** | **-0.209(0.270)** |
| Member of Cabinet | 0.056(1.311) | -2.129(2.067) |
| GDP/Capita *t* | -0.0001(0.0002) | 0.0005\*(0.0003) |
| MS Right-Left Position | -3.842\*\*(1.436) | 1.092(2.282) |
| Single Currency Dummy | 2.699(3.126) | 4.960\*(2.910) |
| Public Euroscepticism *t-1* | -8.822(14.666) | -13.717(29.735) |
| Distance in Euroscepticism with Nearest Competitor | -0.345(0.644) | -0.558(1.697) |
| Average District Magnitude | 0.430\*\*\*(0.110) | -0.152(0.294) |
| ∆ in Party System Euroscepticism | -0.774(0.520) | -1.119(0.734) |
| ∆ in Party System Right-Left Position | 0.491(1.153) | -0.193(1.046) |
| Radical Left Vote Share*t-1* | 0.114\*(0.058) | -59.063\*\*\*(18.242) |
| Year | -0.418(0.451) | -1.009\*(0.523) |
| Intercept | 834.964(897.006) | 2043.822\*(1047.285) |
| N | 100 | 92 |
| Clusters | 14 | 14 |
| R2 Within | 0.575 | 0.475 |
| R2 Between | 0.012 | 0.078 |
| R2 Overall | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| BIC | 559.279 | 572.191 |

*Note*: Table entries are OLS Regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors, clustered by country, and fixed-effects. Model A7 is restricted to centre-right parties, Model A8 is restricted to centre-left parties.

*\*\*\* p ≤0.01; \*\* p ≤.0.05; \* p ≤.0.10.*

**Table A.9: Effect of Mainstream Shifts on Mainstream Vote Share (Interaction with Radical Left)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| DV: Mainstream Party Vote Share | Model A8 | Model A9 | Model A10 |
|  | Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient |
|  | (SE) | (SE) | (SE) |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share*t-1* | 0.142(0.179) | 0.212(0.182) | -0.125(0.203)  |
| **∆ MS Euroscepticism*t*** | -0.474(0.618) | 0.399(0.358) | -0.753 (0.662)  |
| **Radical Right Vote Share*t-1*** | 0.013(0.156) | 0.207\*(0.118) | -0.209 (0.245)  |
| **Radical Left Vote Share*t-1*** | -0.160\*(0.085) | 0.093(0.060) | -0.579\*\*\* (0.164)  |
| **∆ MS Euroscepticism*t\** Radical Left Vote Share*t-1*** | 0.027(0.018) | -0.021(0.029) | 0.048\*\* (0.0204)  |
| Member of Cabinet | -1.251(1.738) | -0.080(1.330) | -1.966 (2.194)  |
| GDP/Capita *t* | 0.0002(0.0002) | -0.0001(0.0002) | 0.001\* (0.0002) |
| MS Right-Left Position | -0.808(1.187) | -3.804(1.479) | 0.997(2.130)  |
| Single Currency Dummy | 3.961\*\*(1.751) | 2.706(3.118) | 6.064\*\* (2.514)  |
| Public Euroscepticism*t*  | -16.135(18.797) | -8.309(14.855) | -10.56 (27.07)  |
| Distance in Euroscepticism with Nearest Competitor | -1.303(0.786) | -0.312(0.644) | -0.857 (1.742)  |
| Average District Magnitude | 0.218(0.134) | 0.421\*\*\*(0.114) | -0.200 (0.267) |
| ∆ in Party System Euroscepticism | -0.526(0.492) | -0.855(0.518) | -1.105 (0.786)  |
| ∆ in Party System Right-Left Position | -0.140(0.985) | -0.453(1.113) | -0.184 (1.200)  |
| Year | -0.636(0.393) | -0.453(0.467) | -1.199\*\* (0.517) |
| Intercept | 1277.585(785.196) | 905.317(929.893) | 2423.728\*\* (1035.85)  |
| N | 192 | 100 | 92 |
| Clusters | 14 | 14 | 14 |
| R2 Within | 0.346 | 0.578 | 0.494 |
| R2 Between | 0.025 | 0.011 | 0.070 |
| R2 Overall | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| BIC | 1170.295 | 558.6069 | 568.787 |

*Note*: Model A8, Model A9 and Model A10 are identical to Model 2, Model 3 and Model A1 of this study, but showing an interaction with lagged radical left vote share rather. Table entries are OLS Regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors, clustered by country, and fixed-effects. *\*\*\* p ≤0.01; \*\* p ≤.0.05; \* p ≤.0.10.*

**Table A.10: Effect of Mainstream Shifts on Mainstream Vote Share (Including only Observations in Which Radical Right Party is more Eurosceptic than Mainstream Party)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| DV: Mainstream Party Vote Share | Model A11 | Model A12 | Model A13 | Model A14 |
|  | Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient |
|  | (SE) | (SE) | (SE) | (SE) |
| Mainstream Party Vote Share*t-1* | 0.0780(0.190)  | 0.0715(0.186)  | 0.147(0.161)  | -0.272(0.212)  |
| **∆ MS Euroscepticism*t*** | -0.377(0.594)  | 0.150(0.619)  | 1.576\*\*(0.620)  | -1.319\*\* (0.584)  |
| **Radical right Vote Share*t-1*** | 0.007(0.217) | 0.00514(0.238**)** | 0.211\*(0.107)  | -0.484(0.278)  |
| **∆ MS Euroscepticism*t\** Radical right Vote Share*t-1*** | **.** | -0.0715(0.0675)  | -0.149\*\* (0.0675) | 0.210\*\*\* (0.0589)  |
| Member of Cabinet | -1.165(1.664) | -1.087(1.727) | 0.403(1.029)  | -0.834(2.035)  |
| GDP/Capita *t* | 0.0002(0.0002) | 0.0002(0.0002)  | -0.0001(0.0002)  | 0.001\*\* (0.0003)  |
| MS Right-Left Position | -0.453(1.359)  | -0.394(1.380)  | -1.891(1.669)  | 3.531(2.485)  |
| Single Currency Dummy | 4.256(2.493)  | 4.508\*(2.499)  | 3.022(4.532)  | 3.650(2.352)  |
| Public Euroscepticism*t*  | -11.07(16.90)  | -7.599(17.99)  | 3.258(15.50)  | -10.35(28.23)  |
| Distance in Euroscepticism with Nearest Competitor | -1.184(0.735) | -1.087(0.801)  | -0.734(0.528) | -0.843(1.927)  |
| Average District Magnitude | 0.334(0.255)  | 0.294(0.245)  | 0.869\*\*(0.330)  | -0.658\*(0.344)  |
| ∆ in Party System Euroscepticism | -0.464(0.556) | -0.568(0.659)  | -0.93 (0.659)  | -1.189(0.689)  |
| ∆ in Party System Right-Left Position | 0.211(1.153)  | 0.435(1.412)  | 1.546(2.332)  | -0.490(1.369)  |
| Radical Left Vote Share*t-1* | -31.79\*\*(12.22)  | -33.70\*\*(13.98)  | -19.30(14.42)  | -57.87\*\*\* (16.59)  |
| Year | -0.682(0.502)  | -0.751(0.480)  | -0.373(0.696)  | -1.190\*\* (0.531)  |
| Intercept | 1366.3(1008.7)  | 1505.0(963.5)  | 723.9(1397.4)  | 2428.4\*\* (1065.0)  |
| N | 164 | 164 | 79 | 85 |
| Clusters | 14 | 14 | 13 | 13 |
| R2 Within | 0.338 | 0.347 | 0.670 | 0.542 |
| R2 Between | 0.014 | 0.018 | 0.23 | 0.040 |
| R2 Overall | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| BIC | 1014.207 | 1011.948 | 425.456 | 521.657 |

*Note*: Table entries are OLS Regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors, clustered by country, and fixed-effects.

*\*\*\* p ≤0.01; \*\* p ≤.0.05; \* p ≤.0.10*

**Figure A.1: Effect of Mainstream Party Shifts on Vote Share as Radical Left Party Electoral Strength Varies**



*Note*: Radical left party electoral success is on the x-axis, the marginal effect of a shift in mainstream party position regarding the EU is on the y-axis. The solid black line is the expected effect, the dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. The black ticks along the x-axis show the distribution of radical left party electoral success. This figure is based on Model A8 in Table A.9.

**Figure A.2: Effect of Mainstream Party Shifts on Vote Share as Radical Left Party Electoral Strength Varies for Centre-Right Parties**



*Note*: Radical left party electoral success is on the x-axis, the marginal effect of a shift in mainstream party position regarding the EU is on the y-axis. The solid black line is the expected effect, the dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. The black ticks along the x-axis show the distribution of radical left party electoral success. This figure is based on Model A9 in Table A.9.

**Figure A.3: Effect of Mainstream Party Shifts on Vote Share as Radical Left Party Electoral Strength Varies for Centre-Left Parties**



*Note*: Radical left party electoral success is on the x-axis, the marginal effect of a shift in mainstream party position regarding the EU is on the y-axis. The solid black line is the expected effect, the dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. The black ticks along the x-axis show the distribution of radical left party electoral success. This figure is based on Model A10 in Table A.9.