The globalisation divide in the public mind:

Belief systems on globalisation and their electoral consequences

**Online Appendix**

[A1: Party positions in the 2017 German election 2](#_Toc19880498)

[A2: “Globalisation” in the party manifestos for the 2017 German federal election 5](#_Toc19880499)

[A3: Question wording and wave coverage 11](#_Toc19880500)

[A4: Additional indicators of “non-attitudes” toward globalisation 18](#_Toc19880501)

[A5: A closer look at globalisation attitude stability 20](#_Toc19880502)

[A6: Pairwise correlations between issue items 21](#_Toc19880503)

[A7: Pairwise correlations between additive indices 22](#_Toc19880504)

[A8: Explaining attitudes towards globalisation issues and globalisation 23](#_Toc19880505)

[A9: Additional results for vote choice and party approval models 25](#_Toc19880506)

[References 34](#_Toc19880507)

# A1: Party positions in the 2017 German election

In Figure 2 of the main article, we present positions of German parties on globalisation-related issues in the context of the 2017 election based on data from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2019). In this part of the appendix, we:

1. present information on how we coded (net) positions based on the items from the Manifesto dataset,
2. provide an enlarged version of Figure 2 which additionally includes other issues and contains information on the frequency of negative and positive statements (in addition to net positions), and
3. list bivariate correlations of party positions on the different issues.

We calculated (net) party positions with the goal to calculate positions on similar issues as those used in our individual-level analysis. We calculated positions on seven issue areas as follows:

* Free trade = Protectionism: Negative - Protectionism: Positive
* EU = European Community/Union: Positive - European Community/Union: Negative
* Internationalism = Internationalism: Positive - Internationalism: Negative
* Multiculturalism = Multiculturalism: Positive - Multiculturalism: Negative
* Redistribution= (Market Regulation + Controlled Economy + Welfare State Expansion)/3 – (Free Market Economy + Economic Orthodoxy + Welfare State Limitation)/3
* Cultural Liberalism= Traditional Morality: Negative - Traditional Morality: Positive
* Civil Liberties= Freedom and Human Rights - Law and Order: Positive

In Figure 2 of the article, we concentrate on net positions on globalisation-related issues, i.e. free trade, EU, internationalism and multiculturalism. **Figure A 1** below is an enlarged version that additionally includes information on the three other issues and on the relativefrequency of negative and positive statements. **Table A 1** shows bivariate correlations between positions on all these issues for the six German parties in 2017. Given the very low number of cases and potential measurement issues, we do not wish to read too much out of the listed correlations. Yet, it becomes evident that positions on the globalisation-related issues align well, whereas positions on free trade and redistribution are unrelated. This pattern favours *the single globalisation dimension hypothesis* over the *embedding hypothesis*. At the same time, cultural liberalism is strongly associated with positions on the four globalisation items.

**Figure A 1: Party positions on globalisation-related and other issues in the 2017 German election**

Note: The graph displays positive and negative statements on a given issue (in % of all statements in the respective party’s manifesto) and the difference between the two as net position (♦).

**Table A 1: Pairwise Pearson correlations between party positions in the 2017 German election**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Free trade | EU | Internationalism | Multiculturalism | Redistribution | Cultural liberalism | Civil liberties |
| Free trade | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU | 0.96\*\* | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Internationalism | 0.85\* | 0.88\* | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| Multiculturalism | 0.71 | 0.84\* | 0.76 | 1.00 |  |  |  |
| Redistribution | -0.08 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.60 | 1.00 |  |  |
| Cultural liberalism | 0.75 | 0.90\* | 0.75 | 0.97\*\* | 0.57 | 1.00 |  |
| Civil liberties | 0.31 | 0.22 | -0.18 | 0.20 | -0.25 | 0.22 | 1.00 |

Notes. Pearson’s correlation coefficients; n=6; \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, \*\*\*p < .001.

# A2: “Globalisation” in the party manifestos for the 2017 German federal election

In **Table A 2** below, we list examples—three for each party—of how the major German parties talk about “globalisation” in their party manifestos for the 2017 federal election. We chose instances in which the parties address “globalisation” most directly and which seemed to us as representing the overall rhetoric of the respective party well. To substantiate the claims made in the article, the table indicates (a) which substantive domains and topics are—explicitly or implicitly—linked to “globalisation” in these statements, and (b) whether the statements reveal a positive, negative or ambivalent stance towards “globalisation”. The following documents were used:

AfD (2017): Programm für Deutschland. Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag am 24. September 2017, URL: <https://www.afd.de/wahlprogramm> (last accessed: 9 July 2019).

BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (2017): Zukunft wird aus Mut gemacht. Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017, URL: <https://www.gruene.de/artikel/gruenes-wahlprogramm-zur-bundestagswahl-2017-zukunft-wird-aus-mut-gemacht> (last accessed: 9 July 2019).

CDU/CSU (2017): Für ein Deutschland, in dem wir gut und gerne leben. Regierungsprogramm 2017-2021, URL: <https://www.cdu.de/regierungsprogramm> (last accessed: 9 July 2019).

DIE LINKE (2017): Sozial. Gerecht. Frieden. Für alle. Die Zukunft, für die wir kämpfen! Langfassung des Wahlprogramms zur Bundestagswahl 2017, URL: <https://www.die-linke.de/fileadmin/download/wahlen2017/wahlprogramm2017/die_linke_wahlprogramm_2017.pdf> (last accessed: 9 July 2019).

FDP (2017): Denken wir neu. Das Programm der Freien Demokraten zur Bundestagswahl 2017: „Schauen wir nicht länger zu.“ URL: <https://www.fdp.de/programm/denken-wir-neu> (last accessed: 9 July 2019).

SPD (2017): Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit. Unser Regierungsprogramm für Deutschland. URL: <https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Regierungsprogramm/SPD_Regierungsprogramm_BTW_2017_A5_RZ_WEB.pdf> (last accessed: 9 July 2019).

Table A 2: Examples of how German parties talk about “globalisation”

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Party** | **Content** | **Tone** | **English translation** | **German original** |
| CDU/CSU | Economic | Positive | Globalisation, which has been taking place for many decades, has greatly benefited the vast majority of countries and their citizens. It has also contributed significantly to the creation of our prosperity. Germany is an export nation that benefits particularly from open markets and international supply relationships. | „Von der Globalisierung, die bereits seit vielen Jahrzehnten stattfindet, haben die allermeisten Länder und ihre Bürger enorm profitiert. Sie hat auch wesentlich zur Schaffung unseres Wohlstands beigetragen. Deutschland ist eine Exportnation, die von offenen Märkten und internationalen Lieferbeziehungen besonders profitiert.“  (CDU/CSU 2017: 23) |
| CDU/CSU | Economic;  link between global interdependencies and the need for international political cooperation and institutions | Positive | We fight every kind of protectionism and promote international trade agreements and cooperation. The modern globalised world in which we live is compatible neither with seclusion or foreign policy isolation nor with a policy that emphasizes only its own national interest. | „Wir bekämpfen jede Art von Protektionismus und treten für internationale Handelsabkommen und Zusammenarbeit ein. Die moderne globalisierte Welt, in der wir leben, verträgt sich weder mit Abschottung oder außenpolitischer Isolation noch mit einer Politik, die nur das scheinbar eigene nationale Interesse in den Vordergrund stellt.“  (CDU/CSU 2017: 7) |
| CDU/CSU | Link between global interdependencies and the need for international political institutions | Ambivalent to positive | The process of globalisation also needs rules and standards to prevent excesses and undesirable developments. That is why cooperation in G7 and G20 is so important, so we need the European Union and the United Nations, the OECD, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. | „Auch der Prozess der Globalisierung braucht Regeln und Standards, um Auswüchse und Fehlentwicklungen zu verhindern. Deshalb ist die Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen von G7 und G20 so wichtig, deshalb brauchen wir die Europäische Union und die Vereinten Nationen, die OECD, die Weltbank und den Internationalen Währungsfonds.“ (CDU/CSU 2017: 23) |
| FDP | Economic | Ambivalent to positive | Cross-border trade is most likely to unlock the potential for inclusive and sustainable prosperity when there are legally binding rules for global value chains. We Free Democrats are therefore committed to strengthening multilateral rights-based trade relations. We want to strengthen the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the central place to create a fair global trade system. Many people are afraid that free trade endangers high consumer and labour protection in this country. But if we reduce barriers to trade, and at the same time take our high standards of human rights, food and environmental security as the legal basis, we have a unique opportunity to give fair rules to globalisation. Free trade agreements can set the legal framework to make these high sustainability standards the basis of our trade. Germany is the world's strongest exporting economy and at the same time the most export-dependent economy, and needs free-trade based on legal foundations. The fear of free trade must therefore give way to optimism and hope for progress and peace. | „Grenzüberschreitender Handel kann das Potenzial für inklusiven und nachhaltigen Wohlstand am ehesten entfalten, wenn rechtsverbindliche Regeln für globale Wertschöpfungsketten bestehen. Wir Freie Demokraten setzen uns daher für eine Stärkung der multilateralen, rechtebasierten Handelsbeziehungen ein. Wir wollen dazu die Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) als zentralen Ort zur Schaffung eines gerechten globalen Welthandelssystems stärken. Viele Menschen haben Angst, dass Freihandel den hierzulande hohen Verbraucher- und Arbeitsschutz gefährdet. Wenn wir aber Handelshemmnisse abbauen und gleichzeitig unsere hohen Standards bei Menschenrechten, Lebensmittel- und Umweltsicherheit als Rechtsgrundlage nehmen, haben wir die einmalige Chance, der Globalisierung gerechte Regeln zu geben. Freihandelsabkommen können den rechtlichen Rahmen festlegen, um diese hohen Nachhaltigkeitsstandards zur Grundlage unseres Handels zu machen. Deutschland ist die exportstärkste und gleichzeitig aber auch exportabhängigste Volkswirtschaft weltweit und braucht den auf Rechtsgrundlagen beruhenden freien Handel. Die Angst vor Freihandel muss daher Optimismus und der Hoffnung auf Fortschritt und Frieden weichen.“  (FDP 2017: 103-104) |
| FDP | Economic | Positive | Free access to the financial and capital markets is essential for the German economy. The financial centre Germany is in intense global competition. We reject unilateral charges and national unilateralism as well as distortions of competition from subsidies or state-subsidized companies in other countries. Instead, we rely on the further development of European and worldwide economic and regulatory standards. Germany is one of the world's largest commodity consumers with high import dependencies. That is why a secure supply of raw materials is fundamental to our country. We want to conclude further international raw material partnerships and at the same time reduce trade barriers. | „Der freie Zugang zu den Finanz- und Kapitalmärkten ist essenziell für die deutsche Wirtschaft. Der Finanzplatz Deutschland steht in einem intensiven globalen Wettbewerb. Einseitige Belastungen und nationale Alleingänge lehnen wir ebenso wie Wettbewerbsverzerrungen durch Subventionen oder staatlich unterstützte Unternehmen in anderen Ländern ab. Stattdessen setzen wir auf die Weiterentwicklung europäischer und weltweit gültiger Wirtschafts- und Regulierungsstandards. Deutschland ist weltweit einer der größten Rohstoffverbraucher mit hohen Importabhängigkeiten. Deshalb ist eine sichere Rohstoffversorgung grundlegend für unser Land. Wir wollen weitere internationale Rohstoffpartnerschaften abschließen und zugleich Handelshemmnisse abbauen.“  (FDP 2017: 131) |
| FDP | Multidimensional | Ambivalent | Globalisation and digitization have made countries more interconnected than ever. But this also allows for new forms of industrial espionage and cyberattacks, and requires new privacy and cyber security strategies. | „Durch Globalisierung und Digitalisierung sind Staaten heute vernetzter denn je. Das ermöglicht aber auch neue Formen der Wirtschaftsspionage und Cyberattacken und erfordert neue Strategien für Datenschutz und Cybersicherheit.“  (FDP 2017: 105) |
| SPD | Economic | Ambivalent | The SPD is committed to fair trade. Trade policy is not just an instrument for promoting economic development. The core issue is the question of according to which rules we want to live in in a globalised world. National unilateralism and protectionism promise no success. Open markets are good, but they must also be free of competitive distortions. If this is not guaranteed, effective safeguard measures will have to be taken, especially at European level. The best framework for these negotiations is the United Nations with its organizations for labour (ILO), trade (UNCDAT) and development (UNIDO), as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO). | „Die SPD setzt sich für fairen Handel ein. Handelspolitik ist nicht nur ein Instrument der Wirtschaftsförderung. Im Kern geht es um die Frage, nach welchen Regeln wir in einer globalisierten Welt leben wollen. Nationale Alleingänge und Protektionismus versprechen keinen Erfolg. Offene Märkte sind gut, dort muss aber auch frei von Wettbewerbsverzerrungen gehandelt werden. Falls dies nicht gewährleistet ist, müssen gerade auf europäischer Ebene effektive Schutzmaßnahmen greifen. Der beste Rahmen für diese Verhandlungen sind die Vereinten Nationen mit ihren Organisationen für Arbeit (ILO), Handel (UNCDAT) und Entwicklung (UNIDO), sowie die Welthandelsorganisation (WTO).“  (SPD 2017: 110) |
| SPD | Economic; link between global interdependencies and the need for international political cooperation and institutions | Ambivalent | Fair globalisation, fair trade, development policy and the 2030 Agenda: Social Democratic peace policy is committed to social justice on a global scale. Forty years after the creation of the North-South Commission under Willy Brandt, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, as part of the 2030 Agenda, combine poverty reduction and human development with environmental sustainability, economic development, peace and international cooperation. | „Gerechte Globalisierung, fairer Handel, Entwicklungspolitik und Agenda 2030: Sozialdemokratische Friedenspolitik setzt sich für soziale Gerechtigkeit im globalen Maßstab ein. 40 Jahre nach Einsetzung der Nord-Süd-Kommission unter Willy Brandt verbinden die nachhaltigen Entwicklungsziele der Vereinten Nationen im Rahmen der Agenda 2030 Armutsbekämpfung und menschliche Entwicklung mit ökologischer Nachhaltigkeit, Wirtschaftsentwicklung, Frieden und internationaler Zusammenarbeit.“  (SPD 2017: 108) |
| SPD | Link between global interdependencies and the need for international political cooperation and institutions | Ambivalent to positive | Our policy is based on the conviction that the major global tasks of the future—from the fight against hunger and poverty to climate change, to armed conflicts and worldwide migration movements—can only be managed in partnership. In the spirit of Willy Brandt, international politics is "the realistic attempt to solve problems peacefully". Both characterize social democratic foreign, development and peace policy today: the goal of a peaceful, fair and rule-based international order and the willingness to take the practically possible step, even if it is small and risky. | „Unsere Politik gründet sich auf der Überzeugung, dass die großen globalen Zukunftsaufgaben – vom Kampf gegen Hunger und Armut über den Klimawandel bis hin zu bewaffneten Konflikten und weltweiten Migrationsbewegungen – nur partnerschaftlich zu bewältigen sind. Internationale Politik ist ganz im Sinne Willy Brandts „der illusionslose Versuch zur friedlichen Lösung von Problemen“. Beides prägt sozialdemokratische Außen-, Entwicklungs- und Friedenspolitik auch heute: die Zielvorstellung einer friedlichen, gerechten und regelbasierten internationalen Ordnung und die Bereitschaft, den praktisch möglichen Schritt zu gehen, selbst wenn er nur klein und mit Risiken behaftet ist.“  (SPD 2017: 102) |
| Greens | Economic; political | Ambivalent | Both the nationalist way of countering the downsides of globalisation with isolation and the neoliberal way of forcing globalisation without regulation are leading to the abyss. We stand for a different path—the path of peaceful and open cooperation and global solidarity. Fair global trade can ensure that the benefits of globalisation accrue to more people. | „Sowohl der nationalistische Weg, den Schattenseiten der Globalisierung mit Abschottung zu begegnen, als auch der neoliberale Weg, Globalisierung ohne Regulation zu forcieren, führen in den Abgrund. Wir stehen für einen anderen Weg – den Weg friedlicher und offener Kooperation und globaler Solidarität. Gerechter globaler Handel kann dafür sorgen, dass die Vorteile der Globalisierung mehr Menschen zugutekommen.“  (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2017: 90-91) |
| Greens | Multidimensional | Ambivalent | Globalisation is characterized by drastic contradictions. It makes relations and exchanges between countries closer. It has never been so easy to travel to distant lands. Science and culture are also stimulated by international exchange. From getting up to going to bed, we are surrounded by products that would not exist without global trade. Germany benefits from open markets. Globalisation has also led to an increase in wealth and has led hundreds of millions of people out of extreme poverty in the countries of the global South. But globalisation also has an anarchic, unjust and brutal side. | „Die Globalisierung ist durch drastische Widersprüche geprägt. Sie macht die Beziehungen und den Austausch zwischen Ländern enger. Nie war es so einfach, in ferne Länder zu reisen. Auch Wissenschaft und Kultur befruchten sich durch internationalen Austausch. Vom Aufstehen bis zum Schlafengehen umgeben uns Produkte, die es ohne weltweiten Handel nicht gäbe. Deutschland profitiert von offenen Märkten. Die Globalisierung hat auch in den Ländern des globalen Südens zu einem Anstieg des Wohlstands und hunderte Millionen Menschen aus extremer Armut geführt. Doch die Globalisierung hat eben auch eine anarchische, ungerechte und brutale Seite.“  (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2017: 90) |
| Greens | Multidimensional; link between global interdependencies and the need for international political cooperation and institutions | Ambivalent to positive | The big cross-border problems of our time are too big for small-scale government: combating the climate crisis, hunger, poverty, war and terrorism, corruption, the fair shaping of globalisation and the commitment to a humane refugee policy and the inclusion of all in social prosperity and progress. We can do it all only with a functioning EU. It must be the democratic answer to globalisation. | „Die großen grenzüberschreitenden Probleme unserer Zeit sind für Kleinstaaterei zu groß: Kampf gegen die Klimakrise, Hunger, Armut, Krieg und Terrorismus, Korruption, die gerechte Gestaltung der Globalisierung sowie der Einsatz für eine humane Flüchtlingspolitik und die Teilhabe aller am gesellschaftlichen Wohlstand und am Fortschritt. Wir können all das nur mit einer funktionierenden EU bewältigen. Sie muss die demokratische Antwort auf die Globalisierung sein.“  (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2017: 68) |
| Left Party | Economic | Negative | Mass unemployment and poverty on a global scale, wars, right-wing and Islamist terror, millions of people fleeing persecution, poverty, war and the consequences of climate change and leaving their homes—all this shows that global capitalism is leading to more and more upheavals and crises. | „Massenerwerbslosigkeit und Armut im globalen Maßstab, Kriege, rechter und islamistischer Terror, Millionen Menschen, die vor Verfolgung, Armut, Krieg und den Folgen des Klimawandels fliehen und ihre Heimat verlassen müssen – all das zeigt: Der globale Kapitalismus führt zu immer mehr Verwerfungen und Krisen.“  (DIE LINKE 2017: 10) |
| Left Party | Economic | Negative | DIE LINKE opposes the further globalisation of agricultural markets. We want to end the export strategy in agricultural policy. | „DIE LINKE wendet sich gegen die weitere Globalisierung der Agrarmärkte. Wir wollen die Exportstrategie in der Agrarpolitik beenden.“  (DIE LINKE 2017: 88) |
| Left Party | Economic | Negative | Due to the pressure of the financial markets and global competition between businesses locations too little is invested, even in the upswing. The divide between rich and economically dependent regions is growing. The market does not lead to socially meaningful investments. | „Der Druck der Finanzmärkte und der globale Standortwettbewerb führen dazu, dass selbst im Aufschwung zu wenig investiert wird. Die Spaltung zwischen reichen und wirtschaftlich abgehängten Regionen wächst. Der Markt kann Investitionen nicht gesellschaftlich sinnvoll lenken.“  (DIE LINKE 2017: 74) |
| AfD | Economic | Ambivalent to negative | Wherever markets fail in free trade, trade policy should intervene in a corrective way. With a strategic trade policy, we safeguard the interests of our citizens and protect their jobs in global competition. | „Dort, wo im Freihandel die Märkte versagen, soll die Handelspolitik korrigierend eingreifen. Mit einer strategischen Handelspolitik nehmen wir die Interessen unserer Bürger wahr und schützen ihre Arbeitsplätze im globalen Wettbewerb.“  (AfD 2017: 21) |
| AfD | Cultural (education) | Negative | The AfD rejects the influence of international corporations, foundations and other lobby groups on our education system and thus on the future viability of Germany. An economization and globalisation of the German education system will not happen with us. | „Die AfD lehnt den Einfluss von internationalen Konzernen, Stiftungen und anderen Lobbygruppierungen auf unser Bildungssystem und damit auf die Zukunftsfähigkeit Deutschlands ab. Eine Ökonomisierung und Globalisierung des deutschen Bildungswesens wird es mit uns nicht geben.“  (AfD 2017: 43) |
| AfD | Cultural (migration) | Negative | Individual protection and asylum guarantees were created in 1949 for persecuted individuals. They promise the impossible in today's conditions of mass, globalised migration. They cannot be sustained. | „Individuelle Schutz- und Asylgarantien wurden 1949 für verfolgte Einzelpersonen geschaffen. Sie versprechen unter den heutigen Bedingungen der massenhaften, globalisierten Wanderungsbewegungen Unmögliches. Sie können nicht aufrechterhalten werden.“  (AfD 2017: 28) |

# A3: Question wording and wave coverage

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Table A 3: Coverage of key items in the GLES campaign panel 2017 | | |
| Field time | Wave | Item coverage |
| 2016, Oct-Nov | 1 | European integration, immigration, redistribution, |
| 2017, Feb-Mar | 2 | Redistribution, civil liberties |
| 2017, May | 3 | Globalisation, European integration, immigration, redistribution, civil liberties, cultural liberalism |
| 2017, July | 4 | Immigration |
| 2017, Sep-Oct | 8 (post-election) | Globalisation, vote choice |
| 2018, Mar | 9 | Globalisation, economic openness, voting intention |

Globalisation

**glob**

Overall, globalisation is a good thing.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(waves 3, 8, 9)

Alles in allem ist die Globalisierung eine gute Sache.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

Economic openness

**ecoopen1**

The global integration of markets should be promoted further.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(wave 9)

Das weltweite Zusammenwachsen der Märkte sollte weiter vorangetrieben werden.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

**ecoopen2**

Germany should restrict the import of foreign products.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely (reversed)

(wave 9)

Deutschland sollte die Einfuhr von Waren aus anderen Ländern einschränken.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

**ecoopen3**

Foreign companies should be allowed to invest in Germany without restrictions.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(wave 9)

Ausländische Unternehmen sollten in Deutschland uneingeschränkt investieren dürfen.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

Immigration

**immi1**

Let’s talk about immigration. Do you think laws on immigration of foreigners should be relaxed or made tougher? (1) relax immigration restrictions – (7) make immigration restrictions tougher

(wave 3)

Jetzt geht es um Zuzugsmöglichkeiten für Ausländer. Sollten die Zuzugsmöglichkeiten für Ausländer erleichtert oder eingeschränkt werden?

(1) Zuzug von Ausländern erleichtern – (7) Zuzug von Ausländern einschränken

**immi2**

Germany needs a cap on the number of refugees accepted per year.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(wave 4)

Deutschland braucht eine jährliche Obergrenze für die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

**immi3**

Refugees, who came to Germany for economic reasons, should be deported.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(wave 1)

Flüchtlinge, die aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen nach Deutschland kommen, sollten abgeschoben werden.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

European integration

**europe1**

Should European integration be pushed further such that there will soon be a common European government or is European integration already going too far. What is your opinion on this matter?

(1) European integration pushed further – (7) European integration already going too far (reversed)

(wave 1)

Sollte die europäische Einigung so vorangetrieben werden, dass es bald eine gemeinsame europäische Regierung gibt oder geht die europäische Einigung schon jetzt viel zu weit? Wie ist Ihre Meinung zu diesem Thema?

(1) Europäische Einigung vorantreiben – (7) Europäische Einigung geht jetzt schon viel zu weit

**europe2**

There are differences in how strongly people feel attached to Germany, Europe, their state and their community. What about you? How strongly do you feel attached … to the European Union?

(1) Not all attached – (5) Strongly attached

(wave 3)

Menschen fühlen sich unterschiedlich stark mit Deutschland, Europa, ihrem Bundesland und ihrer Gemeinde verbunden. Wie ist das bei Ihnen? Wie stark fühlen Sie sich verbunden mit … der Europäischen Union?

(1) gar nicht verbunden – (5) stark verbunden

**europe3**

Germany should provide financial support to EU member states that are in big economic and financial troubles.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(wave 3)

Deutschland sollte EU-Mitgliedsstaaten, die große wirtschaftliche und finanzielle Schwierigkeiten haben, finanziell unterstützen.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

Redistribution

**redis1**

The government should adopt measures to reduce differences in incomes.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(wave 3)

Der Staat sollte Maßnahmen ergreifen, um die Einkommensunterschiede zu verringern.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

**redis2**

A cap on managers’ salaries should be introduced.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(wave 3)

Die Politik sollte eine Obergrenze für Manager-Gehälter einführen.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

**redis3**

Rich citizens should pay more tax than they do now.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(wave 2)

Reiche Bürger sollten mehr Steuern bezahlen als bisher.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

Civil liberties

**civlib1**

The state's powers in the fight against crime should be extended, even if this leads to greater surveillance of citizens.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(wave 3)

Die staatlichen Befugnisse in der Kriminalitätsbekämpfung sollten ausgeweitet werden, auch wenn das zu einer stärkeren Überwachung der Bürger führt.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

**civlib2**

Some believe that the state should intervene in the fight against terrorism without restriction in the privacy and freedom of movement of citizens. Others argue that the privacy and freedom of movement of citizens should always be protected, even if it hinders the fight against terrorism. And what is your personal opinion on the topic of "State intervention in the fight against terrorism"?

(1) in favour of strong state intervention – (5) against strong state intervention

(wave 2)

Manche meinen, dass der Staat bei der Bekämpfung des Terrorismus ohne Einschränkungen in die Privatsphäre und die Bewegungsfreiheit der Bürger eingreifen soll. Andere meinen, die Privatsphäre und Bewegungsfreiheit der Bürger soll immer geschützt werden, auch wenn es die Terrorismusbekämpfung behindert. Und welche Meinung haben Sie persönlich zum Thema „Eingriffe des Staates bei der Terrorismusbekämpfung“?

(1) für starke Eingriffe des Staates – (5) gegen starke Eingriffe des Staates

Cultural liberalism

**cultlib1**

Same sex couples should also be allowed to adopt children.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(wave 3)

Auch gleichgeschlechtliche Lebenspartnerschaften sollten Kinder adoptieren können.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

Political awareness

Additive index (mean) of political interest and additive political knowledge index

Political knowledge questions:

* How much percent of the party vote is needed for a party to surely gain representation in the German Bundestag?

(numbers to be entered)

(wave 1)

* Which of the two votes in German Bundestag elections is decisive for the distribution of seats in the Bundestag?

(1) “Erststimme“, (2) “Zweitstimme“, (3) both similarly important

(wave 1)

* Who elects the German federal chancellor?

1. „Bundesrat“, (2) „Bundesversammlung“, (3) „Bundestag“, (4) the people

(wave 1)

* Index [0, 1] with number of correct answer

Ab wie viel Prozent der Zweitstimmen kann eine Partei auf jeden Fall Abgeordnete in den Bundestag entsenden?

[Textfeld]

* Wie ist das eigentlich bei Bundestagswahlen, welche der beiden Stimmen ist ausschlaggebend für die Sitzverteilung im Bundestag?

(1) Erststimme, (2) Zweitstimme, (3) beide gleich wichtig

* Durch wen wird die Bundeskanzlerin bzw. der Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gewählt?

(1) den Bundesrat, (2) die Bundesversammlung, (3) den Bundestag, (4) das Volk

Political interest:

How strongly are you interested in politics in general?

(1) Very strong – (5) Not at all

recoded to range from 0 to 1

(wave 3)

Wie stark interessieren Sie sich im Allgemeinen für Politik?

(1) sehr stark – (5) überhaupt nicht

Norm to vote

Here are some common statements on politics and society. Please state, whether you agree or disagree: In a democracy, it is the duty of all citizens to vote regularly in elections.

(1) Do not agree at all – (5) Agree completely

(wave 5, wave 8, wave 9)

Hier ist eine Reihe von häufig gehörten Meinungen über Politik und Gesellschaft. Geben Sie bitte an, ob Sie diesen Meinungen zustimmen oder nicht: In der Demokratie ist es die Pflicht jedes Bürgers, sich regelmäßig an Wahlen zu beteiligen.

(1) Stimme überhaupt nicht zu – (5) Stimme voll und ganz zu

Voting decision

As you know, you could cast two votes in the federal election: The first vote for a candidate of your district and the second vote for a party. Who did you mark on your ballot? [In the survey, the screen with this question shows a ballot on which respondents can mark a box with the party they voted for] Second vote:

(1) CDU/CSU, (2) SPD, (3) Greens, (4) Left, (5) AfD, (6) FDP, (7) Another party, (8) None (will not vote)

(wave 8 and, if wave 8 is missing, wave 9)

Bei der Bundestagswahl konnten Sie ja zwei Stimmen vergeben. Die Erststimme für einen Kandidaten aus Ihrem Wahlkreis und die Zweitstimme für eine Partei. Was haben Sie auf Ihrem Stimmzettel ankreuzt? Zweitstimme:

(1) CDU/CSU, (2) SPD, (3) Bündnis 90/die Grünen, (4) Die Linke, (5) AfD, (6) FDP, (7) Andere Partei, (8) Keine Partei (werde nicht wählen)

Party approval

Please state what you think in general about the political parties. – [CDU / CSU / FDP / SPD / Greens / Left / AfD].

(-5) I think poorly of that party – (5) I think highly of that party

(wave 9)

Was halten Sie so ganz allgemein von den einzelnen politischen Parteien? – [CDU / CSU / FDP / SPD / Greens / Left / AfD].

(-5) Halte überhaupt nichts von der Partei – (5) halte sehr viel von der Partei

Vote intention

As you know, you have two votes to cast in the federal election: The first vote for a candidate of your district and the second vote for a party. Who will you vote for? [In the survey, the screen with this question shows a ballot on which respondents can mark a box with the party they would vote for] Second vote:

(1) CDU/CSU, (2) SPD, (3) Greens, (4) Left, (5) AfD, (6) FDP, (7) Another party, (8) None (will not vote)

(wave 9)

Bei der Bundestagswahl können Sie ja zwei Stimmen vergeben. Die Erststimme für einen Kandidaten aus Ihrem Wahlkreis und die Zweitstimme für eine Partei. Was werden Sie auf Ihrem Stimmzettel ankreuzen? Zweitstimme:

(1) CDU/CSU, (2) SPD, (3) Bündnis 90/die Grünen, (4) Die Linke, (5) AfD, (6) FDP, (7) Andere Partei, (8) Keine Partei (werde nicht wählen)

Party identification

In the Federal Republic, many people lean towards a political party for an extended period of time although they vote for a different party now and then. How about you: Do you—generally speaking—lean towards a political party? And if so: Which party?

(1) CDU (2) CSU, (3) FDP, (4) SPD, (5) Bündnis 90/die Grünen, (6) Die Linke, (7) AfD, (8) Another party, (9) None

(wave 1)

In Deutschland neigen viele Leute längere Zeit einer bestimmten politischen Partei zu, obwohl sie auch ab und zu eine andere Partei wählen. Wie ist das bei Ihnen: Neigen Sie - ganz allgemein gesprochen - einer bestimmten Partei zu? Und wenn ja, welcher?

(1) CDU (2) CSU, (3) FDP, (4) SPD, (5) Bündnis 90/die Grünen, (6) Die Linke, (7) AfD, (8) Andere Partei, (9) Keine Partei

Leader approval

Please state what you think in general about these leading politicians. ­– Angela Merkel [Horst Seehofer; Martin Schulz; Christian Lindner; Kathrin Göring-Eckardt; Sahra Wagenknecht; Frauke Petry].

(-5) I think poorly of that politician – (5) I think highly of that politician

(wave 1: Horst Seehofer, Christian Lindner, Kathrin Göring-Eckardt, Frauke Petry; wave 2: Martin Schulz, Sahra Wagenknecht)

Bitte geben Sie nun an, was Sie von einigen führenden Politikern halten. ­– Angela Merkel [Horst Seehofer; Martin Schulz; Christian Lindner; Kathrin Göring-Eckardt; Sahra Wagenknecht; Frauke Petry].

(-5) Halte überhaupt nichts von dem Politiker – (5) Halte sehr viel von dem Politiker

Perceived economic situation (ego)

How do you currently rate your own economic situation?

(1) very good – (5) very bad

(wave 1, reversed)

Wie beurteilen Sie Ihre derzeitige eigene wirtschaftliche Lage?

(1) sehr gut – (5) sehr schlecht

Perceived economic situation (country)

How would you generally rate the current economic situation in Germany?

(1) very good – (5) very bad

(wave 1, reversed)

Wie beurteilen Sie ganz allgemein die derzeitige wirtschaftliche Lage in Deutschland?

(1) sehr gut – (5) sehr schlecht

Education

What is your highest school degree?

(1) school completed without degree *–* (2) Hauptschulabschluss *–* (3) Realschulabschluss *–* (4) Fachhochschulreife *–* (5) Abitur *–* (9) still in school;

recoded: (1) (2) → „low“; (3) → „medium“; (4) (5) → „high“

(wave 1)

Welchen höchsten allgemeinbildenden Schulabschluss haben Sie?

(1) Schule beendet ohne Abschluss *–* (2) Hauptschulabschluss *–* (3) Realschulabschluss *–* (4) Fachhochschulreife *–* (5) Abitur *–* (9) bin noch Schüler

Income

What is your monthly net income of your household? We are interested in the sum after the deduction of taxes and social security contributions.

(1) under 500 Euro *–* (2) 500 to 750 Euro *–* (3) 750 to 1000 Euro *–* (4) 1000 to 1250 Euro *–* (5) 1250 to *–* (6) 1500 to 2000 Euro *–* (7) 2000 to 2500 Euro *–* (8) 2500 to 3000 Euro *–* (9) 3000 to 4000 Euro *–* (10) 4000 to 5000 Euro *–* (11) 5000 to 7500 Euro *–* (12) 7500 to 10000 Euro *–* (13) 10000 Euro and more

recoded: (1) (2) (3) → <1000€; (4) (5) (6) → 1000-2000€; (7) (8) → 2000-3000€; (9) → 3000-4000€; (10) (11) (12) (13) → >4000€

(wave 1)

Wie hoch ist das monatliche Netto-Einkommen Ihres Haushaltes insgesamt? Gemeint ist die Summe, die nach Abzug von Steuern und Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen übrigbleibt.

(1) unter 500 Euro – (2) 500 bis unter 750 Euro – (3) 750 bis unter 1000 Euro – (4) 1000 bis unter 1250 Euro – (5) 1250 bis unter 1500 Euro – (6) 1500 bis unter 2000 Euro – (7) 2000 bis unter 2500 Euro – (8) 2500 bis unter 3000 Euro – (9) 3000 bis unter 4000 Euro – (10) 4000 bis unter 5000 Euro – (11) 5000 bis unter 7500 Euro – (12) 7500 bis unter 10000 Euro – (13) 10000 Euro und mehr

Gender

Please enter you gender.

(1) male – (2) female

recoded: (0) male – (1) female

(wave x)

Geben Sie bitte Ihr Geschlecht an.

(1) männlich – (2) weiblich

Age

Please enter the year in which you were born.

recoded: age in decades=(year of birth-2017)/10

(wave x)

Tragen Sie bitte ein, in welchem Jahr Sie geboren sind.

Dummy for Eastern Germany

Recode of current residence in state

(0) west: Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Bremen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bayern, Saarland

(1) east: Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thueringen

Schwartz values

Additive mean indices built from the items listed below.

In the following, some persons will be described according to what is important to them. Please indicate how similar or dissimilar the described person is to you. For the person it is important …

(1) is not at all similar to me – (6) is very similar to me

(wave 1)

Im Folgenden werden einige Personen anhand dessen beschrieben, was ihnen wichtig ist. Geben Sie bitte jeweils an, wie ähnlich oder unähnlich Ihnen die beschriebene Person ist.

Es ist der Person wichtig, …

(1) ist mir überhaupt nicht ähnlich – (6) ist mir sehr ähnlich

Conservation

* …to live in secure surroundings. He/she avoids anything that might endanger his safety.
* …that his/her country be safe. He/she thinks that the state should be alert to threats from within and without.
* …be humble and modest. He/she tries not to draw attention to himself/herself.
* …always to behave properly. He/she wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
* …to always follow the rules. He/she thinks people should do what they are told.
* …to conserve the customs he/she has learned. He/she believes it is best to do things in traditional ways.
* …in einem sicheren Umfeld zu leben. Sie vermeidet alles, was ihre Sicherheit gefährden könnte.
* …dass ihr Land sicher ist. Sie denkt, dass der Staat gegenüber äußeren und inneren Bedrohungen wachsam sein muss
* …anspruchslos und bescheiden zu sein. Sie versucht nicht die Aufmerksamkeit anderer zu erregen.
* …sich immer angemessen zu verhalten. Sie möchte vermeiden, irgendetwas zu tun, von dem die Leute sagen könnten, dass es falsch sei.
* …sich immer an die Regeln zu halten. Sie glaubt, dass Menschen tun sollten, was ihnen gesagt wird.
* …die Bräuche zu erhalten, die sie gelernt hat. Sie denkt, dass es das Beste ist, Dinge auf die traditionelle Art und Weise zu tun.

Self-transcendence

* …that every person in the world be treated equally. He/she wants equal opportunities in life for everybody.
* …to listen to people who are different from him/her. Even when he/she disagrees with them, he/she still wants to understand them
* …to help the people around him. He/she wants to care for other people.
* …to be loyal to his/her friends. He/she wants to devote himself to people close to him.
* …to care for nature. Protecting the environment is important to him/her.
* …jeden Menschen auf der Welt gleich zu behandeln. Sie meint, dass jeder im Leben die gleichen Möglichkeiten haben sollte.
* …Menschen zuzuhören, die anders sind als sie. Auch wenn sie nicht mit ihnen übereinstimmt, möchte sie
* …die anderen verstehen.
* …den Menschen um sie herum zu helfen. Sie will sich um deren Wohlergehen kümmern.
* …ihren Freunden gegenüber treu zu sein. Sie will sich für ihr nahestehende Menschen einsetzen.
* …sich um die Umwelt zu kümmern. Die Umwelt zu schützen ist sehr wichtig für sie.

# A4: Additional indicators of “non-attitudes” toward globalisation

Refusals to answer the globalisation question are perhaps the most straightforward indicator of citizens’ unfamiliarity with the concept. Germans have no reasons to fear negative feedback for holding a particular position on globalisation and thus no reason to hold back. In our data, less than one percent of the participants failed to respond to the globalisation item, suggesting that non-attitudes are a minor problem. (While no explicit ‘refuse’ and ‘don’t know’ responses were offered, participants were not forced to respond.) This holds for all three waves, respectively. But while a high share of refusals in this case would have been strong evidence of *un*familiarity, the actual low share is only weak evidence of familiarity, given that survey participants may be motivated to respond despite being unfamiliar with the object. Survey research has shown that respondents often choose the middle category of a scale in these situations (e.g., Sturgis et al. 2014). In our case, roughly half of the respondents chose the middle category, as shown in the left panel of **Figure A 2** below. This is quite a large share, but how many in that group are respondents with non-attitudes and how many have real, but neutral, attitudes?

Figure A 2: Distribution of globalisation attitudes



Note: Raw distributions. Cut-off between high and low awareness is the sample median.

We can get some insight into the matter by looking at respondents with different levels of political awareness. Political awareness was measured with an additive index of political interest and knowledge; the knowledge component of the index consists of three questions about the German electoral system. For details, see section **A3: Question wording and wave coverage** above. As the right panel of **Figure A 2** shows, citizens with low political awareness did more often choose the middle category and less often both opposing and supporting categories than citizens with high political awareness. This gap of roughly 10 percentage points is stable across the three waves. The exact percentages are 52 vs. 41 percent in wave 3; wave 8: 50 vs. 41 percent; wave 9: 48 vs. 39 percent. This pattern, which is unique to the globalisation item, suggests that at least some of the citizens with low political awareness indeed chose the middle category only to give a valid response to the item.

# A5: A closer look at globalisation attitude stability

The additional tables shown here make two points. First, respondents who chose the middle category when the globalisation question was asked the first time subsequently do not show higher variability in their subsequent responses than respondents who were positive or negative at the outset (**Table A 4** below). This suggest that quite a few of middle-category responses indeed reflect meaningful and stable neutral attitudes. Second, response stability seems unrelated to political awareness (**Table A 5** below), suggesting that the diagnosis of globalisation attitude stability applies across the electorate.

*Stability by initial globalisation attitude*

Table A 4: Stability of globalisation attitudes and norms to vote, by initial globalisation attitude

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Globalisation attitude | | | |
|  | Oppose | Neither | Support | Total |
| 0 scale point change | 28 | 48 | 37 | 40 |
| 1 | 35 | 30 | 37 | 33 |
| 2 | 26 | 18 | 20 | 20 |
| 3 or more | 11 | 3 | 5 | 6 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Notes: Reported are column percentages.  \* Reported are total change scores for w3(5)🡪w8 and w8🡪w9 | | | | |

*Stability by political awareness*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A 5: Stability of globalisation attitudes and norms to vote, by political awareness** | | | | | | | | |
|  | Globalisation attitude | | | | Norm to vote | | | |
|  | w3🡪w8 | w8🡪w9 | w3🡪w9 | Total\* | w5🡪w8 | w8🡪w9 | w5🡪w9 | Total\* |
| *Low political awareness* | | | | | | | | |
| 0 scale point change | 58 | 60 | 57 | 41 | 63 | 63 | 61 | 48 |
| 1 | 35 | 34 | 36 | 32 | 26 | 26 | 27 | 22 |
| 2 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 20 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 18 |
| 3 or more | 1 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 12 |
| *High political awareness* | | | | | | | | |
| 0 scale point change | 56 | 59 | 54 | 38 | 67 | 68 | 67 | 56 |
| 1 | 38 | 36 | 39 | 35 | 24 | 23 | 24 | 20 |
| 2 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 21 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 15 |
| 3 or more | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 9 |
| Notes: Reported are column percentages.  \* change scores for w3(5)🡪w8 and w8🡪w9 are summed at the individual level | | | | | | | | |

# A6: Pairwise correlations between issue items

Table A 6: Pairwise Pearson correlations between issue items

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | globw3 | globw8 | globw9 | ecoopen1 | ecoopen2 | ecoopen3 | proeurope1 | Proeurope2 | Proeurope3 | proimmi1 | Proimmi2 | Proimmi3 | proredis1 | proredis2 | proredis3 | procivlib1 | procivlib2 | cultlib1 |
| globw3 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| globw8 | .62 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| globw9 | .62 | .66 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ecoopen1 | .56 | .57 | .73 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ecoopen2 | .24 | .24 | .25 | .30 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ecoopen3 | .28 | .28 | .34 | .38 | .31 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| proeurope1 | .35 | .35 | .34 | .34 | .24 | .21 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| proeurope2 | .35 | .32 | .32 | .30 | .22 | .20 | .37 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| proeurope3 | .34 | .28 | .27 | .25 | .20 | .22 | .43 | .39 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| proimmi1 | .26 | .25 | .23 | .17 | .25 | .20 | .38 | .31 | .48 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| proimmi2 | .20 | .18 | .17 | .11 | .25 | .17 | .36 | .27 | .44 | .69 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| proimmi3 | .18 | .14 | .13 | .08 | .15 | .10 | .30 | .20 | .38 | .53 | .49 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| proredis1 | .07 | -.01 | -.01 | .00 | .00 | .01 | .01 | .06 | .08 | .03 | .03 | .02 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| proredis2 | -.06 | -.07 | -.06 | -.05 | -.11 | -.08 | -.07 | -.02 | -.05 | -.12 | -.14 | -.08 | .43 | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| proredis3 | -.03 | -.05 | -.05 | -.04 | -.02 | -.01 | -.01 | .02 | .02 | -.01 | -.01 | -.04 | .45 | .40 | 1 |  |  |  |
| procivlib1 | -.06 | -.06 | -.06 | -.12 | .09 | .02 | .11 | .04 | .20 | .34 | .37 | .30 | -.03 | -.18 | -.03 | 1 |  |  |
| procivlib2 | .00 | .00 | -.02 | -.05 | .09 | .05 | .10 | .06 | .19 | .30 | .31 | .25 | .04 | -.08 | -.01 | .51 | 1 |  |
| cultlib1 | .19 | .18 | .16 | .11 | .08 | .09 | .16 | .10 | .16 | .21 | .19 | .18 | .14 | .11 | .07 | .01 | .12 | 1 |

Note. Correlations above |0.2| are shaded grey. Significance levels not shown.

# A7: Pairwise correlations between additive indices

Table A 7: Pairwise Pearson correlations between additive indices

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Globalisation | Economic  openness | European  integration | Immigration | Redistribution | Civil  liberties | Cultural  liberalism |
| Globalisation | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic openness | 0.60\*\*\* | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |
| European integration | 0.45\*\*\* | 0.40\*\*\* | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| Immigration | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.39\*\*\* | 1.00 |  |  |  |
| Redistribution | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | 0.00 | -0.07\*\*\* | 1.00 |  |  |
| Civil liberties | -0.03\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.38\*\*\* | -0.08\*\*\* | 1.00 |  |
| Cultural liberalism | 0.20\*\*\* | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.07\*\*\* | 1.00 |

Notes. Pearson’s correlation coefficients; all correlations of new issues and globalisation shaded green; all correlations of old issues shaded yellow; large (r≥|0.2|) cross-correlations in blue; \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, \*\*\*p < .001.

# A8: Explaining attitudes towards globalisation issues and globalisation

As far as the underlying causes of support and opposition to globalisation (issues) are concerned, we follow previous research and focus on potential symbolic and economic threat (Kriesi et al. 2008).

To capture sources of symbolic threat, we take account of two overarching value dimensions from Schwartz’s conceptualization of basic human values (Schwartz 1992; Schwartz et al. 2012). Self-transcendence captures the importance people attach to transcending self-interest on behalf of others. Conservation captures how much people prioritise respect for tradition, deference to convention, and social order. These overarching value dimensions seem particularly appropriate for our purpose. As a general point of departure, Schwartz (2012: 13) argues that self-transcendence and conservation values regulate “how one relates socially to others and affects them.” Given the sociotropic nature of politics, these values map directly onto public debates and allow citizens to evaluate the issues (Goren et al. 2016). This is true for globalisation (issues) in particular. Research has shown that self-transcendence and conservation values are closely related to cosmopolitanism (Bayram 2015), which is one of two political ideologies that seem particularly relevant for tying the globalisation issues together (Zürn & de Wilde 2016). Accordingly, citizens who attach high priority to self-transcendence values—universalism in particular—and low priority to conservation values are likely to embrace a cosmopolitan ideology. While there is no analogous evidence for communitarianism—the second ideology that Zürn & de Wilde (2016) identify as providing the normative underpinning of globalisation debates—it seems highly plausible that the value correlates of this ideology are the exact opposite to that of cosmopolitanism. In short, the more citizens prioritise self-transcendence values, the less threat they should perceive. Seeing the opportunities of globalisation instead, they should support measures that increase global integration. The more citizens prioritise conservation values, in contrast, the more likely they should feel threatened by globalisation and oppose further integration.

We use perceptions of how the economic situation has changed in the last year as indicators of general economic threat. Inter alia, the bleaker citizens perceive the economic situation to be, the more likely they should feel threatened by the prospect of increased global competition. We take account of both egocentric and sociotropic perceptions of the economic situation.

**Table A 8** reports the results for our four globalisation (issue) attitudes. In **Table A 9** we present analogous models for attitudes on ‘old’ policy issue.

Table A 8: Determinants of globalisation (issue) attitudes

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Economic  openness | European  integration | Immigration | Globalisation | |
|  | M1 | M1 | M1 | M1 | M2 |
| Self-transcendence | .11\*\*\* | .20\*\*\* | .36\*\*\* | .15\*\*\* | .04\*\* |
|  | (.01) | (.01) | (.02) | (.02) | (.01) |
| Conservation | -.10\*\*\* | -.31\*\*\* | -.59\*\*\* | -.11\*\*\* | .03 |
|  | (.01) | (.02) | (.02) | (.02) | (.01) |
| Economic situation (ego) | .06\*\*\* | .07\*\*\* | .02\* | .08\*\*\* | .04\*\*\* |
|  | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) |
| Economic situation (country) | .21\*\*\* | .26\*\*\* | .19\*\*\* | .24\*\*\* | .05\*\*\* |
|  | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) |
| Economic openness |  |  |  |  | .59\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (.01) |
| European integration |  |  |  |  | .23\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (.01) |
| Immigration |  |  |  |  | -.02\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (.01) |
| Constant | .41\*\*\* | .26\*\*\* | .15\*\*\* | .34\*\*\* | .04\*\*\* |
|  | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) |
| *N* | 9,443 | 17,935 | 17,958 | 12,384 | 9,441 |
| adj. *R*2 | .11 | .11 | .15 | .10 | .43 |

Notes: Reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; IVs and DVs range from 0 to 1.

Table A 9: Determinants of old policy issue attitudes

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Redistribution | | Civil liberties | | Cultural liberties | |
| Self-transcendence | 0.43\*\*\* | (0.01) | 0.07\*\*\* | (0.02) | 0.54\*\*\* | (0.03) |
| Conservation | 0.17\*\*\* | (0.02) | -0.61\*\*\* | (0.02) | -0.37\*\*\* | (0.03) |
| Economic situation (ego) | -0.16\*\*\* | (0.01) | -0.06\*\*\* | (0.01) | 0.03 | (0.01) |
| Economic situation (country) | 0.01 | (0.01) | 0.04\*\*\* | (0.01) | -0.03 | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.77\*\*\* | (0.01) | 0.36\*\*\* | (0.01) | 0.61\*\*\* | (0.01) |
| *N* | 13,694 | | 13,658 | | 11,201 | |
| adj. *R*2 | 0.088 | | 0.089 | | 0.066 | |

Notes: Reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; IVs and DVs range from 0 to 1. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

# A9: Additional results for vote choice and party approval models

Below, we first present full regression tables (**Table A 10** and **Table A 11**) for the results of the multinomial logit models presented in the form of average marginal effects in Figure 2 of the article. We then report the results of a set of robustness checks for the vote choice models.

We checked the robustness in several ways. First, we re-estimated the multinomial logit models presented in Figure 2 of the article including approval of candidates (the frontrunner of each party) as additional covariate. While this brings our specification closer to the Michigan model, it yields conservative estimates of the total effects of globalisation attitudes (as well as of the other issue attitudes) because it controls for a potential indirect channel of influence (and due to the drop of observations caused by missing values and listwise deletion). In line with that, the results in **Figure A 3** reveal smaller effects. Nonetheless, globalisation attitudes remain predictive of voting for the CDU/CSU, the Left and the AfD even in the full model.

Second, we re-estimated the multinomial logit models presented in Figure 2 of the article excluding the party identification dummies. Similar as for candidate approval, party identification might be partly endogenous to globalisation (issue) attitudes. While this brings our specification farer away from the Michigan model and increases the risk of omitted variable bias, the models indicate an upper bound for the effect of the globalisation variables. As expected, the results in **Figure A 4** reveal stronger effects of the globalisation variables, most notably of the attitudes towards globalisation as such. Yet, there are no strong qualitative differences to the results presented in Figure 2 of the article.

Third, we re-estimated the multinomial logit models using voting intentions from wave 9 instead of recalled voting behaviour. We thereby address concerns with using recalled voting behaviour from (mostly) wave 8 arising from the fact that some of our predictors (one of our measurement points for the globalisation attitude and attitudes towards economic openness) were only measured in the ninth wave. **Figure A 5** shows our main findings to be robust against the alternative of drawing on voting intentions. In particular, those who evaluate globalisation more positively are more likely to intend voting for the CDU/CSU and less likely to intend voting for the AfD and the Left and to note vote at all. The only notable qualitative difference compared to Figure 2of the articleis that there is no significant positive effect for the FDP in the full model.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Fourth, we looked at party approval instead of voting behaviour. While vote choices capture potential behavioural implications and are as such politically more relevant, studying party approval allows us to differentiate between the sister parties CDU and CSU, which advocated slightly different positions on globalisation—particularly on immigration. We estimated OLS models for party ratings (as recorded in wave 9) of all the politically relevant German parties (CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, Greens, Left, AfD). As in the case of voting behaviour, we show results from two different specifications. The first regression model (M1) includes only globalisation attitudes and attitudes towards old policy issues as main variables of interest. In the second model (M2) attitudes towards old and new policy issues as well as globalisation attitudes are accounted for.

The results reported in **Table A 12** and **Table A 13** are broadly similar to those for voting behaviour. In the full model (**Table A 13**), more positive attitudes towards globalisation are associated with more positive evaluations of all the parties but the Left, for which the effect is indistinguishable from zero, and the AfD, for which the association is negative. In the full model, attitudes towards globalisation are overall somewhat stronger predictors of party approval than attitudes towards the specific issues of economic openness and European integration—as was the case for voting behaviour. A comparison of the sister parties CDU and CSU reveals indeed opposite effects of attitudes towards immigration, whereas the other globalisation variables exhibit roughly similar effects.

Table A 10: Full regression table for model 1 of Figure 2 in the article

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | FDP | SPD | Greens | The Left | AfD | Other  party | Did not  vote |
| Globalisation | -0.64 | -1.45\*\*\* | -1.30\*\*\* | -2.67\*\*\* | -4.31\*\*\* | -3.31\*\*\* | -3.26\*\*\* |
|  | (0.33) | (0.30) | (0.37) | (0.31) | (0.32) | (0.37) | (0.35) |
| Redistribution | -0.42 | 1.63\*\*\* | 1.28\*\*\* | 3.33\*\*\* | 0.97\*\* | 1.75\*\*\* | 0.98\*\* |
|  | (0.28) | (0.28) | (0.34) | (0.33) | (0.30) | (0.35) | (0.32) |
| Civil liberties | 0.02 | 0.77\*\* | 1.56\*\*\* | 1.93\*\*\* | -0.45 | 1.01\*\*\* | 1.17\*\*\* |
|  | (0.28) | (0.24) | (0.28) | (0.25) | (0.27) | (0.29) | (0.28) |
| Cult. liberalism | 0.42\* | 0.48\*\* | 0.85\*\*\* | 0.73\*\*\* | -0.59\*\*\* | 0.33 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.23) | (0.19) | (0.18) | (0.21) | (0.20) |
| PI: CDU/CSU | -0.96\*\*\* | -1.92\*\*\* | -1.96\*\*\* | -2.19\*\*\* | -1.83\*\*\* | -2.43\*\*\* | -2.40\*\*\* |
|  | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.21) | (0.18) |
| PI: FDP | 2.78\*\*\* | 0.63 | 0.03 | -0.25 | 0.77 | -0.16 | -0.04 |
|  | (0.32) | (0.40) | (0.55) | (0.55) | (0.39) | (0.51) | (0.46) |
| PI: SPD | 0.27 | 2.33\*\*\* | 0.65\*\* | 0.84\*\*\* | -0.25 | -0.88\*\*\* | -0.22 |
|  | (0.20) | (0.16) | (0.21) | (0.18) | (0.22) | (0.27) | (0.20) |
| PI: Greens | -0.03 | 0.92\*\*\* | 2.45\*\*\* | 1.03\*\*\* | -0.55 | 0.52\* | -0.65\* |
|  | (0.30) | (0.23) | (0.22) | (0.23) | (0.35) | (0.26) | (0.33) |
| PI: The Left | -0.18 | 1.28\*\*\* | 0.41 | 2.79\*\*\* | 0.70\* | 0.62\* | 0.23 |
|  | (0.39) | (0.28) | (0.36) | (0.26) | (0.30) | (0.30) | (0.30) |
| PI: AfD | 0.09 | 0.57 | -0.80 | 0.67\* | 2.61\*\*\* | -0.52 | 0.17 |
|  | (0.40) | (0.33) | (0.64) | (0.33) | (0.28) | (0.40) | (0.32) |
| PI: Other party | -0.04 | 0.37 | -0.90 | 1.03\*\* | 0.75\* | 1.65\*\*\* | 0.14 |
|  | (0.46) | (0.39) | (0.65) | (0.35) | (0.35) | (0.32) | (0.37) |
| Age | -0.52\* | -0.02 | -0.34 | -0.08 | 0.04 | -0.22 | -0.25 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.29) | (0.27) | (0.29) | (0.31) | (0.29) |
| Age squared | 0.06\* | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Female | -0.36\*\* | -0.28\* | -0.19 | -0.31\*\* | -0.48\*\*\* | -0.12 | 0.02 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| Education: medium | 0.33 | -0.13 | 0.20 | -0.04 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.30 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.14) | (0.20) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.18) | (0.16) |
| Education: high | 0.42\* | -0.35\* | 0.43\* | 0.02 | -0.25 | -0.18 | -0.98\*\*\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.15) | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.19) | (0.18) |
| Income: 1000-2000 | 0.39 | -0.07 | -0.19 | -0.05 | -0.08 | -0.06 | -0.39\* |
|  | (0.25) | (0.20) | (0.24) | (0.20) | (0.21) | (0.22) | (0.20) |
| Income: 2000-3000 | 0.17 | -0.13 | -0.64\*\* | -0.47\* | -0.38 | -0.36 | -0.95\*\*\* |
|  | (0.25) | (0.20) | (0.25) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.23) | (0.21) |
| Income: 3000-4000 | 0.22 | 0.01 | -0.38 | -0.12 | -0.10 | -0.32 | -1.17\*\*\* |
|  | (0.27) | (0.22) | (0.27) | (0.23) | (0.24) | (0.27) | (0.26) |
| Income: >4000 | 0.28 | -0.32 | -0.59\* | -0.66\* | -0.22 | -0.56 | -1.52\*\*\* |
|  | (0.27) | (0.24) | (0.28) | (0.27) | (0.26) | (0.30) | (0.31) |
| Eastern Germany | 0.15 | -0.23 | -0.44\* | 0.30\* | 0.33\* | 0.40\*\* | 0.21 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.17) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Economic situation (ego) | -0.29 | -0.56 | -0.01 | -1.24\*\*\* | -0.65\* | -0.90\* | -0.81\* |
|  | (0.33) | (0.29) | (0.36) | (0.31) | (0.32) | (0.35) | (0.33) |
| Economic situation (country) | -0.68\* | -0.43 | 0.30 | -0.21 | -1.73\*\*\* | -0.92\* | -1.19\*\*\* |
|  | (0.35) | (0.31) | (0.39) | (0.32) | (0.33) | (0.37) | (0.34) |
| Constant | 1.02 | -0.27 | -1.06 | -1.29 | 3.83\*\*\* | 2.38\*\* | 4.13\*\*\* |
|  | (0.76) | (0.73) | (0.84) | (0.79) | (0.83) | (0.85) | (0.82) |
| *N* | 6031 | | | | | | |
| McFadden’s R² | 0.291 | | | | | | |

Notes: Reported are coefficients from multinomial logit with standard errors in parentheses; baseline outcome category is CDU/CSU; all IVs range from 0 to 1; reference category for party identity dummies is 'no PI'. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

Table A 11: Full regression table for model 2 of Figure 2 in the article

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | FDP | SPD | Greens | The Left | AfD | Other  party | Did not  vote |
| Globalisation | -0.71 | -1.86\*\*\* | -1.79\*\*\* | -2.57\*\*\* | -3.23\*\*\* | -2.67\*\*\* | -2.95\*\*\* |
|  | (0.41) | (0.37) | (0.45) | (0.39) | (0.41) | (0.45) | (0.43) |
| Econ. openness | 1.02\* | 0.69 | 0.54 | -0.27 | -0.15 | -0.45 | 0.52 |
|  | (0.47) | (0.42) | (0.52) | (0.44) | (0.45) | (0.51) | (0.48) |
| European integration | -0.46 | 0.39 | 0.68 | -0.25 | -0.74\* | -1.00\* | -1.03\*\* |
|  | (0.35) | (0.32) | (0.41) | (0.34) | (0.36) | (0.40) | (0.38) |
| Immigration | -1.46\*\*\* | -0.18 | 0.31 | 0.65\* | -5.70\*\*\* | -0.40 | -0.83\* |
|  | (0.32) | (0.28) | (0.34) | (0.30) | (0.43) | (0.36) | (0.35) |
| Redistribution | -0.48 | 1.68\*\*\* | 1.29\*\*\* | 3.52\*\*\* | 0.37 | 1.77\*\*\* | 0.91\*\* |
|  | (0.29) | (0.29) | (0.35) | (0.33) | (0.31) | (0.35) | (0.33) |
| Civil liberties | 0.58\* | 0.83\*\* | 1.40\*\*\* | 1.84\*\*\* | 0.68\* | 1.36\*\*\* | 1.60\*\*\* |
|  | (0.29) | (0.26) | (0.31) | (0.27) | (0.29) | (0.31) | (0.30) |
| Cult. liberalism | 0.51\*\* | 0.47\*\* | 0.79\*\*\* | 0.68\*\*\* | -0.40\* | 0.42\* | 0.07 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.23) | (0.19) | (0.18) | (0.21) | (0.20) |
| PI: CDU/CSU | -0.96\*\*\* | -1.93\*\*\* | -1.98\*\*\* | -2.17\*\*\* | -1.87\*\*\* | -2.41\*\*\* | -2.38\*\*\* |
|  | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.21) | (0.18) |
| PI: FDP | 2.79\*\*\* | 0.63 | 0.02 | -0.26 | 0.76 | -0.15 | -0.04 |
|  | (0.32) | (0.40) | (0.55) | (0.55) | (0.40) | (0.51) | (0.46) |
| PI: SPD | 0.32 | 2.31\*\*\* | 0.60\*\* | 0.83\*\*\* | -0.12 | -0.83\*\* | -0.16 |
|  | (0.21) | (0.16) | (0.21) | (0.18) | (0.23) | (0.27) | (0.20) |
| PI: Greens | 0.15 | 0.91\*\*\* | 2.36\*\*\* | 0.98\*\*\* | -0.05 | 0.64\* | -0.49 |
|  | (0.30) | (0.23) | (0.23) | (0.24) | (0.37) | (0.26) | (0.33) |
| PI: The Left | -0.14 | 1.27\*\*\* | 0.36 | 2.75\*\*\* | 0.75\* | 0.66\* | 0.28 |
|  | (0.39) | (0.28) | (0.36) | (0.26) | (0.30) | (0.30) | (0.30) |
| PI: AfD | -0.06 | 0.56 | -0.73 | 0.70\* | 2.23\*\*\* | -0.67 | 0.02 |
|  | (0.40) | (0.33) | (0.64) | (0.33) | (0.28) | (0.40) | (0.32) |
| PI: Other party | -0.03 | 0.36 | -0.91 | 1.00\*\* | 0.69 | 1.65\*\*\* | 0.16 |
|  | (0.46) | (0.39) | (0.65) | (0.35) | (0.36) | (0.32) | (0.37) |
| Age | -0.71\*\* | -0.03 | -0.33 | -0.07 | -0.46 | -0.30 | -0.38 |
|  | (0.26) | (0.25) | (0.29) | (0.27) | (0.30) | (0.31) | (0.30) |
| Age squared | 0.08\*\* | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.04 | -0.00 | 0.02 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Female | -0.33\*\* | -0.23\* | -0.14 | -0.32\*\* | -0.52\*\*\* | -0.15 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| Education: medium | 0.35\* | -0.14 | 0.16 | -0.07 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.30 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.14) | (0.20) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.18) | (0.16) |
| Education: high | 0.46\* | -0.39\*\* | 0.33 | -0.04 | -0.16 | -0.12 | -0.93\*\*\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.15) | (0.21) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.18) |
| Income: 1000-2000 | 0.36 | -0.06 | -0.16 | -0.03 | -0.14 | -0.07 | -0.40\* |
|  | (0.25) | (0.20) | (0.24) | (0.20) | (0.21) | (0.22) | (0.20) |
| Income: 2000-3000 | 0.11 | -0.14 | -0.60\* | -0.44\* | -0.47\* | -0.39 | -0.99\*\*\* |
|  | (0.25) | (0.20) | (0.25) | (0.21) | (0.22) | (0.23) | (0.21) |
| Income: 3000-4000 | 0.16 | -0.00 | -0.34 | -0.10 | -0.23 | -0.36 | -1.24\*\*\* |
|  | (0.27) | (0.23) | (0.27) | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.27) | (0.26) |
| Income: >4000 | 0.20 | -0.36 | -0.59\* | -0.66\* | -0.35 | -0.59 | -1.55\*\*\* |
|  | (0.28) | (0.24) | (0.29) | (0.27) | (0.27) | (0.30) | (0.31) |
| Eastern Germany | 0.11 | -0.24 | -0.42\* | 0.34\* | 0.29\* | 0.39\*\* | 0.18 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.17) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Econ. situation (ego) | -0.28 | -0.59\* | -0.12 | -1.29\*\*\* | -0.68\* | -0.90\* | -0.80\* |
|  | (0.33) | (0.29) | (0.36) | (0.31) | (0.32) | (0.35) | (0.33) |
| Econ. situation (country) | -0.45 | -0.50 | 0.08 | -0.27 | -1.01\*\* | -0.67 | -0.94\*\* |
|  | (0.35) | (0.32) | (0.40) | (0.33) | (0.34) | (0.37) | (0.35) |
| Constant | 1.17 | -0.49 | -1.21 | -1.27 | 5.64\*\*\* | 2.70\*\* | 4.38\*\*\* |
|  | (0.77) | (0.74) | (0.85) | (0.80) | (0.86) | (0.87) | (0.83) |
| *N* | 6031 | | | | | | |
| McFadden’s R² | 0.308 | | | | | | |

Notes: Reported are coefficients from multinomial logit with standard errors in parentheses; baseline outcome category is CDU/CSU; all IVs range from 0 to 1; reference category for party identity dummies is 'no PI'. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

Figure A 3: Effects of attitudes towards globalisation and globalisation issues on vote choice – party leader approval included as additional control



Note. Reported are average marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals from multinomial logit. Additional controls not shown: age, gender, education, income, dummy for Eastern Germany, dummies for party identification, assessment of own and Germany’s economic situation, approval of party leaders. N=4,217 for both models. McFadden’s R² is 0.39 for model 1 and 0.40 for model 2.

Figure A 4: Effects of attitudes towards globalisation and globalisation issues on vote choice – party identification excluded



Note. Reported are average marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals from multinomial logit. Additional controls not shown: age, gender, education, income, dummy for Eastern Germany, assessment of own and Germany’s economic situation. N=6,037 for both models. McFadden’s R² is 0.14 for model 1 and 0.17 for model 2.

Figure A 5: Effects of attitudes towards globalisation and globalisation issues on voting intentions (wave 9)



Note. Reported are average marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals from multinomial logit. Additional controls not shown: age, gender, education, income, dummy for eastern Germany, dummies for party identification, assessment of own and Germany’s economic situation. N=5,998 for both models. McFadden’s R² is 0.28 for model 1and 0.30 for model 2.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table A 12: Party approval model 1 (globalisation attitude only, without attitudes towards globalisation issues)   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | |  | CDU | CSU | FDP | SPD | Greens | Left | AfD | | Globalisation | 0.34\*\*\* | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.31\*\*\* | 0.06\*\*\* | -0.23\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | | Redistribution | -0.14\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* | 0.03\* | 0.04\*\* | 0.27\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | | Civil liberties | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.21\*\*\* | -0.12\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.14\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Cultural liberalism | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.10\*\*\* | -0.01 | 0.03\*\* | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | -0.11\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: CDU/CSU | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.02\* | 0.01 | -0.11\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: FDP | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.00 | -0.07\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | | PI: SPD | 0.00 | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.03\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.05\*\*\* | -0.11\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: Greens | -0.00 | -0.10\*\*\* | -0.07\*\*\* | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.29\*\*\* | 0.10\*\*\* | -0.12\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: The Left | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.10\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.33\*\*\* | -0.10\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: AfD | -0.12\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* | -0.14\*\*\* | -0.15\*\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | 0.42\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: Other party | -0.07\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.04\*\* | -0.07\*\*\* | -0.05\*\* | -0.02 | -0.01 | |  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | | Age/10 | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.08\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.04\*\* | 0.01 | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (Age/10)² | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.00\*\*\* | 0.00\*\* | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.00\*\*\* | -0.00 | |  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | | Female | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.02\*\*\* | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.02\*\*\* | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.00 | -0.01\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Education medium | 0.02\* | -0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.02\* | 0.01 | -0.02\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Education high | 0.01 | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.01 | -0.02\* | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.01 | -0.05\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Income 1000-2000 | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Income 2000-3000 | 0.01 | 0.03\*\* | 0.01 | -0.00 | -0.01 | -0.03\* | -0.03\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Income 3000-4000 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.02\* | -0.02\* | -0.03\* | -0.02 | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Income >4000 | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.00 | -0.03\*\* | -0.03\* | -0.04\*\* | -0.03\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | East Germany | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.01 | -0.01\* | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Economic situation (ego) | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.04\* | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.05\*\*\* | -0.02 | 0.03\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | | Economic situation (country) | 0.22\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | | Constant | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.50\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.07 | 0.11\*\* | 0.65\*\*\* | |  | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | | *N* | 8424 | 8412 | 8393 | 8397 | 8397 | 8402 | 8402 | | adj. *R*2 | 0.425 | 0.344 | 0.163 | 0.313 | 0.353 | 0.307 | 0.388 |   Notes: Reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; DV and IV range is 0-1 in all cases; reference categories: low education, income below 1000€, West Germany, no party identification. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.  **Table A 13: Party approval model 2 (full model, including attitudes towards globalisation issues)**   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | |  | CDU | CSU | FDP | SPD | Greens | Left | AfD | | Globalisation | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.01 | -0.12\*\*\* | |  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | | Economic openness | -0.02 | -0.03 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.04\* | -0.03 | -0.09\*\*\* | |  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | | European integration | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.03\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.08\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | |  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | | Immigration | 0.07\*\*\* | -0.19\*\*\* | -0.10\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | | Redistribution | -0.14\*\*\* | -0.14\*\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.04\*\* | 0.27\*\*\* | -0.07\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | | Civil liberties | -0.13\*\*\* | -0.16\*\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.00 | 0.09\*\*\* | -0.02\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Cultural liberalism | -0.04\*\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.03\*\* | -0.08\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: CDU/CSU | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.01 | -0.00 | -0.12\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: FDP | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.00 | -0.07\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | | PI: SPD | -0.01 | -0.04\*\*\* | -0.03\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* | 0.09\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: Greens | -0.03\* | -0.08\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.08\*\*\* | -0.08\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: The Left | -0.10\*\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.01 | 0.03\*\* | 0.32\*\*\* | -0.07\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: AfD | -0.10\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.11\*\*\* | -0.11\*\*\* | -0.08\*\*\* | 0.39\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | PI: Other party | -0.07\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.04\*\* | -0.07\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.02 | -0.01 | |  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | | Age/10 | -0.04\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.02 | -0.03\* | -0.01 | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (Age/10)² | 0.00\*\*\* | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.00\*\*\* | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.00\* | 0.00\* | 0.00 | |  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | | Female | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.02\*\*\* | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.00 | -0.02\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Education medium | 0.02\* | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.02\* | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.02\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Education high | 0.00 | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.01 | -0.03\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.03\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Income 1000-2000 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.01 | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Income 2000-3000 | 0.01 | 0.02\* | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.02 | -0.04\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Income 3000-4000 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.02\* | -0.03\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Income >4000 | -0.00 | 0.01 | -0.00 | -0.03\* | -0.02 | -0.04\*\* | -0.03\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | East Germany | 0.01 | -0.00 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.04\*\*\* | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.03\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | Economic situation (ego) | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.04\* | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.05\*\*\* | -0.02 | 0.03\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | | Economic situation (country) | 0.19\*\*\* | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.08\*\*\* | -0.07\*\*\* | |  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | | Constant | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* | 0.03 | 0.10\* | 0.69\*\*\* | |  | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | | *N* | 8424 | 8412 | 8393 | 8397 | 8397 | 8402 | 8402 | | adj. *R*2 | 0.440 | 0.357 | 0.168 | 0.349 | 0.403 | 0.318 | 0.423 | |

Notes: Reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; DV and IV range is 0-1 in all cases; reference categories: low education, income below 1000€, West Germany, no party identification. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

# References

Bayram, A. Burcu. 2015. What Drives Modern Diogenes? Individual Values and Cosmopolitan Allegiance. *European Journal of International Relations* 21(2):451-79.

Goren, Paul, Harald Schoen, Jason Reifler, Thomas J. Scotto, William Chittick. 2016. A Unified Theory of Value-Based Reasoning and U.S. Public Opinion. *Political Behavior* 38(4):977–97.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, Timotheos Frey (Eds.). 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 1992. Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries. In: Mark P. Zanna (Ed.). *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. New York: Academic Press: 1-66

Schwartz, Shalom H. 2012. An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values. *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture* 2(1):1-20.

Schwartz, Shalom H., Jan Cieciuch, Michele Vecchione, Eldad Davidov, Ronald Fischer, Constanze Beierlein, Alice Ramos, Markku Verkasalo, Jan-Erik Lönnqvist, Kursad Demirutku. 2012. Refining the Theory of Basic Individual Values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 103(4):663-88.

Sturgis, Patrick, Caroline Roberts, Patten Smith. 2014. Middle Alternatives Revisited: How the Neither/Nor Response Acts as a Way of Saying “I Don’t Know”? *Sociological Methods & Research* 43(1):15-38.

Volkens, Andrea, Werner Krause, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel, Bernhard Weßels. 2019. The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2019a. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB); <https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2019a>.

Zürn, Michael, Pieter de Wilde. 2016. Debating Globalization: Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism as Political Ideologies. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 21(3):280-301.

1. Note that the ninth wave was carried out after the completion of the coalition negotiations such that their political repercussions might drive differences in results. In particular, many blamed the FDP for the failure of the coalition talks between CDU/CSU, Greens and FDP and the party’s support dropped in polls. This drop is present in our data as well and is a plausible explanation for the difference in the results. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)