

Appendix A: Manipulations

Study 1

Figure 1: Example of an Automatic Voter Registration Manipulation^a

Automatic Voter Registration: A Confusing Mess	Automatic Voter Registration: A Common Sense Solution
-	-
<i>About the Author:</i>	<i>About the Author:</i>
<i>Brian Kubiak is an election lawyer for the Democratic Party who has practiced election law in Washington DC for almost two decades.</i>	<i>Matt Osbourne is a recent law school graduate and a newly hired election lawyer for the Republican Party in Washington DC.</i>
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Automatically registering citizens using an antiquated voter information system would cause widespread confusion. The switch to electronic records would be sloppy and inefficient, costing the taxpayer money as public officials try to sort the mess out. Meanwhile, inefficiency means the system as a whole slows down on election day, leading to longer lines at the polls, and more loopholes through which criminals can commit voter fraud. Even beyond these problems, choosing not to vote is an act of free speech. Using government records to register voters without asking first violates that right. While we should encourage citizens to vote, an automatic voter registration system harms the voter more than it helps due to confusing, costly, insecure execution.	Automatic voter registration makes common sense, sorely needed changes to our electoral system. It modernizes the often antiquated, paper-based system many states use today by making the switch to electronic records. This helps streamline communication between election officials, making the voter system more efficient. This means less time waiting in line at the polls, fewer errors in the system, and less cost to the tax payer. This efficiency decreases the likelihood of voter fraud by leaving fewer loopholes in the system. Moreover, any citizen who does not want to be registered to vote can simply choose not to be registered, ensuring that the voters freedom of speech has not been encroached upon. In sum, automatic registration is cost-effective, efficient, secure, and respectful of voters' rights.

^aOrder of the articles, as well as both the expertise and partisan cues, were randomly manipulated using Qualtric survey software.

Figure 2: Example of a GMO Label Manipulation^a

**GMO Labels Make Food
More Expensive, Not Any
Safer**

About the Author:

Daniel Burke is a professor of genetics and biology at University of Texas. He received his Ph.D. in genetics from Yale University. He is a registered Democrat and a regular contributor to this column.

Foods made with Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) are safe to eat, and GMO labels promote misinformation, not safety. Thorough laboratory testing across many studies has revealed a strong scientific consensus that foods produced with GMOs are safe to eat. Not only are GMO foods safe, but they more cost-effective to produce, and often more tasty and nutritious than traditional crops. Instead of providing people with useful information, mandatory GMO labels would only intensify the misconception that so-called "Frankenfoods" endanger people's health. GMO labels only serve to scare consumers instead of informing them, while driving up the costs of production and the price we pay at the grocery store.

**GMO Labels Increase
Consumer Safety, Not Food
Costs**

About the Author:

James Bolger is a professor of political science at University of Texas. He received his B.A. in political science from Arizona State University. He is a registered Republican and a regular contributor to this column.

Foods produced with Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) should be clearly labeled to promote consumer safety. Scientific evidence regarding the safety of GMOs is mixed: While some studies may indicate minimal risk, others raise human safety concerns that may arise from genetic engineering due to the introduction of new allergens. This includes an increased level of naturally occurring allergens, plant toxins, or changes in nutrition. The lack of scientific consensus is bad news for the consumer. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not currently require safety testing on genetically modified crops, nor do they require any companies to do safety testing of their genetically engineered crops. Consumers deserve to know what is in their food for their own safety.

^aOrder of the articles, as well as both the expertise and partisan cues, were randomly manipulated using Qualtric survey software.

Study 2

Figure 3: Example of an Automatic Voter Registration Manipulation^a

<u>Article A</u>	<u>Article B</u>
Automatic Voter Registration is a Confusing Mess	Automatic Voter Registration is a Common Sense Solution
<i>Brian Kubiak is election lawyer for the non-profit, non-partisan research organization Vote Smart who has practiced election law in Washington DC for two decades.</i>	<i>Aiden Green is a recent law school graduate and newly hired election lawyer for the non-profit, non-partisan research organization Vote Smart in Washington DC.</i>

^aOrder of the articles, as well as both the expertise and partisan cues, were randomly manipulated using Qualtrics survey software.

Figure 4: Example of a GMO Labels Manipulation^a

<u>Article A</u>	<u>Article B</u>
GMO Labels Increase Food Costs, Not Consumer Safety	GMO Labels Make Food Safer, Not More Expensive
<i>Daniel Burke is an associate professor of genetics and biology at the University of Texas. He received his Ph.D. in genetics from Yale University and is a regular contributor to the MSNBC science column.</i>	<i>James Bolger is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Texas. He received his B.A. in Political Science from Arizona State University and is a regular contributor to the Fox News science column.</i>

^aOrder of the articles, as well as both the expertise and partisan cues, were randomly manipulated using Qualtrics survey software.

Figure 5: Example of a Trade Tariffs Manipulation^a

<u>Article A</u>	<u>Article B</u>
Trade Tariffs Hurt Americans' Wallets -	Trade Tariffs Benefit American Consumers -
<i>Evan Cooke is a former assistant trade negotiator for the United States government under the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. He is now a Senior Financial Analyst and contributor for MSNBC.</i>	<i>John Carr is a former clerk for the United States government under the U.S. Department of Transportation. He is now a contributor for Fox News.</i>

^aOrder of the articles, as well as both the expertise and partisan cues, were randomly manipulated using Qualtric survey software.

Figure 6: Example of a Drone Strikes Manipulation^a

<u>Article A</u>	<u>Article B</u>
Military Drone Strikes Do More Harm Than Good -	Military Drone Strikes Keep America Safe -
<i>Sean West served as a counterterrorism strategist and military analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He now works as a policy advisor for the Democratic Party on matters related to foreign policy.</i>	<i>Scott Reid served as a foreign language translator for the U.S. embassy in Spain. He now works as a policy advisor for the Republican Party on matters related to foreign policy.</i>

^aOrder of the articles, as well as both the expertise and partisan cues, were randomly manipulated using Qualtric survey software.

Appendix B: Manipulation Testing

Measuring Perceived Ideology and Perceived Honesty

I conducted pilot tests for each manipulation utilized in either of the two studies to ensure that the manipulations were affecting perceptions of the author's expertise as intended, rather than perceptions of the author's ideology or perceptions of the author's honesty. To measure perceptions of the author's ideology, respondents were asked simply to place the author on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from "Very liberal" to "Very conservative". Answers were recoded from 0 to 6, with higher scores indicating that the author was perceived to be more conservative. To measure perceptions of the author's honesty, respondents were asked to how well the following terms described the author using five-point Likert scales: "honest", "fair", "authentic", and "sincere". Answers to these questions were averaged, creating a reliable index of author honest ($\alpha = .846$).

GMO Labels

Manipulations for the GMO related issue were tested using the side-by-side format utilized in Study 1. As such, respondents were asked to rate the perceived ideology and perceived honesty for both candidates. As in the main analysis, the scores for the author opposed to GMO labels (con author) were subtracted from the scores of the author in favor of GMO labels (pro author), creating a differenced measure as the dependent variable.

Beginning with perceptions of ideology, the expertise manipulation (expert pro author) revealed a null relationship with perceptions of ideology. This would indicate that the expertise manipulation did not lead respondents to believe that the author was either more liberal or more conservative than his novice counterpart. Instead, perceptions of ideology were primarily dominated by the binary indicator of the author's partisanship, with Democrat authors being viewed as more liberal (relative to Republican authors). Analysis included an interaction between the author's partisanship and the respondent's own partisan identification to account for potential heterogeneous effects among Democratic and Republican respondents. However, there was little evidence supporting

such a heterogeneous relationship.

Table 1: Perceived Ideology (GMO Labels)

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>
	Difference in Perceived Ideology (Pro Author - Con Author)
Expert pro author	-0.328 (0.315)
Democrat Pro Author	-1.562** (0.572)
Partisan Identification	0.047 (0.116)
Dem. Pro Author * Partisan Id.	0.182 (0.170)
Constant	0.467 (0.432)
Observations	244
Adjusted R ²	0.052

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table 2 addresses the factors influencing perceptions of author honesty. Once again, the dependent variable subtracts the honesty score of the con author from that of the pro author, resulting in a differenced measure. The expertise manipulation exhibited a small, null relationship with perceptions of honesty, alleviating concerns regarding a potential confound. In fact, none of the relevant variables or experimental conditions exhibited a substantively or statistically significant relationship with perceptions of author honesty.

Table 2: Perceived Honesty (Pro Author - Con Author)

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	
	Difference in Perceived Honesty
Expert pro author	0.145 (0.127)
Democrat pro author	0.231 (0.126)
Copartisan pro author	−0.035 (0.076)
Partisan identification	0.062 (0.034)
Constant	−0.147 (0.150)
Observations	294
Adjusted R ²	0.016
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.05; **p<0.01	

Automatic Voter Registration

The automatic voter registration issue frame was also tested utilizing the side-by-side format utilized in Study 1. In regards to perceived ideology of the authors, the expertise manipulation yielded little evidence to suggest that an expert was viewed as more liberal or conservative than a novice author, alleviating concerns regarding a potential confound.

Table 3: Perceived Ideology (Automatic Voter Registration)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Difference in Perceived Ideology (Pro Author - Con Author)	
Expert pro author	0.098 (0.340)
Democrat pro author	-2.365** (0.620)
Partisan identification	0.049 (0.134)
Dem. Pro Author * Partisan Id.	-0.114 (0.181)
Constant	0.364 (0.486)
Observations	234
Adjusted R ²	0.206
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.05; **p<0.01	

Moving to perceptions of author honesty, analysis yielded little evidence of a potential confound for the expertise manipulation. Results in Table 4 yielded neither substantively notable nor statistically significant evidence of a correlation between perceptions of author honesty and the author's level of expertise regarding election law.

Table 4: Perceived Honesty (Automatic Voter Registration)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Perceived Honesty (Pro Author - Con Author)	
Expert pro author	0.089 (0.127)
Democrat pro author	0.079 (0.152)
Copartisan pro author	-0.043 (0.076)
Partisan Identification	0.058 (0.034)
Constant	-0.028 (0.152)
Observations	294
Adjusted R ²	-0.001

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Trade Tariffs

The trade tariffs manipulation was tested utilizing a single author format. Rather than placing two articles side-by-side from two different authors, respondents were shown only one argument from an author arguing in opposition to newly instituted trade tariffs. Thus, rather than utilizing a differenced assessment of two authors, analysis utilized a direct assessment of that one authors' perceived ideology or perceived honesty.

Analysis of perceptions of ideology on the trade tariffs issue yielded small, statistically insignificant results for the trade tariff manipulation. Perceptions were instead dominated by the partisan cue, though this effect also failed to achieve statistical significance.

Table 5: Perceived Ideology (Trade Tariffs)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Perceived Ideology
Expert author	−0.037 (0.155)
Democrat author	−0.407 (0.290)
Partisan Identification	−0.001 (0.053)
Dem. Author * Partisan Id.	0.010 (0.078)
Constant	3.171*** (0.233)
Observations	325
Adjusted R ²	0.007
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Regarding perceptions of honesty, analysis again yielded little to suggest that the expertise manipulation was potentially confounded. In fact, neither the expertise manipulation nor partisan cue appeared to affect perceptions of author honesty, belaying confound-related concerns.

Drone Strikes

Finally, the drone strikes manipulations were also tested utilizing the same single author format. Beginning with perceptions of ideology, analysis reveals little evidence that would suggest that the expertise manipulation is correlated with the dependent variable in a meaningful way. It is worth noting that the analysis is underpowered, potentially contributing to the null findings for the expertise manipulation. However, given the very small effect size relative to the partisan cue, I believe these results provide sufficient evidence to belay concerns of an ideological confound in the experimental condition.

Table 6: Perceived Honesty (Trade Tariffs)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Perceived Honesty
Expert author	0.123 (0.080)
Democrat author	0.142 (0.084)
Copartisan author	−0.065 (0.042)
Partisan identification	0.006 (0.020)
Constant	2.081** (0.106)
Observations	319
Adjusted R ²	0.008
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table 7: Perceived Ideology (Drone Strikes)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Perceived Ideology
Expert author	0.039 (0.299)
Democrat author	0.704 (0.507)
Partisan Identification	−0.007 (0.117)
Dem. Author * Partisan Id.	−0.046 (0.167)
Constant	4.033*** (0.353)
Observations	128
Adjusted R ²	0.002
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Turning to perceptions of honesty, the coefficient representing the expertise manipulation remains close to zero, indicating that the manipulation had very little effect on perceptions of the authors' honesty.

Table 8: Perceived Honesty (Drone Strikes)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Perceived Honesty
Expert author	−0.008 (0.123)
Democrat author	−0.499** (0.155)
Copartisan author	0.368* (0.156)
Partisan Identification	−0.042 (0.035)
Constant	3.263** (0.184)
Observations	124
Adjusted R ²	0.062
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Appendix C: Sample Demographics

Study 1

Study 1 utilizes a convenience sample of 949 students from a large public university in the southwestern United States. Both women (58% women, 42% men) and Democrats (67.3% Democrat/lean Democrat, 8.5% pure independent, 24.2% Republican/lean Republican) were over-represented relative to the national population. The sample was more racially diverse than the typical student sample (22.3% White or European American, 11.6% Black or African American, 27.8% Asian, 32.6% Hispanic, 5.1% other).

Study 2

Study 2 utilizes a convenience sample of 982 student from a large public university in the southwestern United States. Once again, both women (53.1% women, 46.9% men) and Democrats (67.9% Democrat/lean Democrat, 7.2% pure independent, 39.9% Republican/lean Republican) were over-represented relative to the national population. In addition, the sample was again more racially diverse than a typical student sample (18.3% White or European American, 13.0% Black or African American, Asian 30.3%, 31.8% Hispanic, 4.7% other).

Appendix D: Analysis with Additional Controls

Analysis featured two additional control variables. First, I controlled for the respondents' political partisanship, which was measured using the aforementioned branching measure borrowed from the 2016 ANES. I included this measure to account for the fact that Democrats generally have a much more positive disposition towards automatic voter registration than Republicans. While this measure is an imperfect measure of the respondent's previously held beliefs on polarizing political issues, studies utilizing partisanship, political ideology, or other demographic factors have found this approach to be far more parsimonious and less susceptible to framing effects, while producing few, if any statistical differences from typical issue position measures (Feldman et al. 2013; Feldman et al. 2018; Mummulo 2016). As previously noted, public opinion polling indicates few differences in opinions among Democrats and Republicans in regards to GMO labels.

Second, I controlled for the partisanship of the author to account for counter-stereotypic arguments. Both theory and prior evidence suggests that an audience may find an argument to be stronger and more persuasive when a partisan or potentially biased source makes an argument that goes against stereotypical expectations (Clavert 1985). Based on aforementioned stereotypes, respondents may expect a Democratic (Republican) author to make an argument for (against) automatic voter registration. Thus, when an author flouts that expectation (e.g. a Democrat argues against automatic voter registration), respondents may perceive this to be a strong signal that bolsters the persuasiveness of the argument. To account for this, analysis included a simple binary

measure, indicating whether or not the pro author was a Democrat. If respondents find the counter-stereotypic arguments to be more persuasive, analysis should yield a strong, negative effect. While I do not expect the partisanship of the author to effect perceptions in the GMO labels issue frame, I nonetheless include this measures for the sake of comparison.

Please note that Model G1, G2, A1, and A2 are identical to those utilized in the text. In addition, the

Table 9: The Effect of Expertise on Perceived Argument Strength

	<i>Dependent variable: Difference in Perceived Argument Strength (Pro Author - Con Author)</i>							
	GMO Labels (G)				Automatic Voter Registration (A)			
	(G1)	(G2)	(G3)	(G4)	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)
Expert pro author	0.592** (0.130)	0.795** (0.193)	0.594** (0.130)	0.792** (0.193)	0.235 (0.126)	0.491** (0.181)	0.232 (0.125)	0.479** (0.180)
Copartisan pro author	-0.043 (0.130)	-0.227 (0.184)	-0.038 (0.131)	-0.218 (0.184)	0.616** (0.126)	0.390* (0.170)	0.628** (0.125)	0.409* (0.169)
Expert * Copartisan		0.370 (0.260)		0.361 (0.261)		0.495* (0.252)		0.479 (0.250)
Respondent party ID			-0.052 (0.095)	-0.054 (0.095)			-0.195* (0.092)	-0.187* (0.092)
Democratic author			-0.052 (0.427)	-0.361 (0.261)			-0.345 (0.410)	-0.312 (0.410)
Constant	0.339** (0.117)	0.237 (0.137)	0.575 (0.608)	0.495 (0.610)	1.054** (0.108)	0.935** (0.124)	1.906** (0.581)	1.743** (0.586)
Observations	834	834	834	834	840	840	840	840
Adjusted R ²	0.022	0.023	0.021	0.022	0.030	0.033	0.045	0.048

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; Key results have been bolded for easier reading.

Appendix E: Analysis Including Political Sophistication

Political sophistication was measured using four close-ended questions: 1) “How long is one term for a U.S. Senator?” (6 years), 2) “What proportion of votes are required for the U.S. Senate to overturn a presidential veto?” (two-thirds), 3) Who is the current Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court? (John Roberts), 4) Which political party currently holds a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives? (the Republican Party, as of spring 2018). Correct answers were added together,

creating a scale of political sophistication ranging from 1 to 4.

Results indicate that the addition of political sophistication does not seem to drastically affect the main effect of the expertise variable. Political sophistication seems to have a positive effect on perceived argument strength

Table 10: The Effect of Expertise on Perceived Argument Strength

	<i>Dependent variable: Difference in Perceived Argument Strength (Pro Author - Con Author)</i>			
	GMO Labels		Automatic Voter Registration	
	(G1)	(G2)	(A1)	(A2)
High expertise pro author	0.586** (0.130)	0.794** (0.193)	0.247 (0.126)	0.504** (0.180)
Copartisan pro author	-0.042 (0.130)	-0.230 (0.184)	0.595** (0.126)	0.367* (0.170)
Political sophistication	0.206 (0.251)	0.223 (0.251)	0.668** (0.242)	0.673** (0.242)
Expert * Copartisan		-0.379 (0.261)		0.499* (0.251)
Constant	0.184 (0.222)	0.066 (0.236)	0.522* (0.221)	0.399 (0.229)
Observations	833	833	839	839
Adjusted R ²	0.022	0.023	0.037	0.041


Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Appendix F: Analysis By Party

Appendix F features analysis that is nearly identical to that utilized in the main body of the text. However, the sample has been divided based on partisanship in order to determine if the reported effects are the same for both Democrats and Republicans. Please note that the coefficients used in these models are not standardized.

Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Partisan Congruence and Pro Author Expertise in the Automatic Voter Registration Frame (Study 1)



To begin, I present a marginal effects plot representing perceived argument strength based on an interaction of expertise and partisanship. This was alluded to on pages 13 and 14, but was moved to the Appendix due to space constraints. Results indicate that the interaction effect found in Table 2 of the manuscript was driven primarily by copartisan biases. However, upon further examination (see below), evidence suggests that this effect was unique to Republican respondents.

Republicans

Study 1

Analysis begins with Study 1, including only Republican respondents. The respondent partisanship variable has been replaced with a similar measure of partisan extremity ranging from “lean Republican” to “Strong Republican”.

Due to the lack of Republican respondents in this non-representative sample, analysis is relatively underpowered. Nonetheless, analysis reveals few differences between Republicans and the full sample. In the GMO Labels manipulation, respondents arguments made by experts to be far

stronger than those made by novices, even when controlling for all other factors. Interestingly, Republican respondents exhibited an interaction effect in the GMO labels frame that was not present for Democratic respondents, with copartisan authors gaining more from the Expertise cue than opposing partisans. Turning to the automatic voter registration frame, analysis again displays few differences from the full sample. After accounting for an interaction between expertise and opposing partisanship, results display a sizable main effect of the expertise variable. In fact, this effect was larger than the similar effect for their Democratic peers. While this effect was not statistically significant at the desired threshold, it is reasonable to suspect that this may be due to a lack of necessary statistical power.

Table 11: The Effect of Expertise on Perceived Argument Strength (Republican respondents)

	<i>Dependent variable: Difference in Perceived Argument Strength (Pro Author - Con Author)</i>							
	GMO Labels (G)				Automatic Voter Registration (A)			
	(G1)	(G2)	(G3)	(G4)	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(8)
Expert pro author	0.726** (0.269)	1.266** (0.381)	0.727** (0.267)	1.269** (0.378)	0.089 (0.253)	0.682 (0.352)	0.090 (0.254)	0.665 (0.355)
Copartisan pro author	-0.104 (0.268)	-0.661 (0.387)	-0.115 (0.267)	-0.674 (0.385)	-0.691** (0.252)	0.155 (0.335)	0.718** (0.254)	0.186 (0.342)
Expert * Copartisan		1.060* (0.533)		1.065* (0.530)		1.199* (0.501)		1.165* (0.507)
Partisan extremity			-0.359 (0.194)	-0.361 (0.192)			-0.149 (0.186)	-0.089 (0.186)
Constant	0.151 (0.231)	-0.109 (0.264)	2.347 (1.206)	2.098 (1.204)	0.809** (0.213)	0.534* (0.240)	1.738 (1.175)	1.096 (1.197)
Observations	218	218	218	218	219	219	219	219
Adjusted R ²	0.026	0.039	0.037	0.050	0.026	0.046	0.024	0.043

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Study 2

Moving now to the Republican respondents in Study 2, analysis again fails to reveal many meaningful differences between Republican and Democratic respondents. The expertise manipulation displayed a substantively large, statistically significant main effect of the expertise cue, with

all other potentially influential factors held constant. This indicates that Republican respondents showed a strong tendency to select articles authored by experts over those authored by novices.

Table 12: The Effect of Expertise and Partisanship on News Article Selection (Republican Respondents)

	<i>Dependent variable: Selected the Pro Policy Argument</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expert pro author	0.800** (0.191)	0.788** (0.192)	0.721* (0.333)	0.715* (0.332)
Copartisan pro author	0.072 (0.233)	0.176 (0.403)	0.055 (0.319)	0.167 (0.461)
Opposing partisan pro author	−0.363 (0.235)	−0.343 (0.412)	−0.465 (0.330)	−0.436 (0.470)
Counter-attitudinal		−0.096 (0.373)		−0.098 (0.372)
Pro-attitudinal		−0.551 (0.368)		−0.552 (0.367)
Counter-sterotypic		0.097 (0.469)		0.090 (0.469)
Stereotypic		−0.253 (0.464)		−0.258 (0.464)
Expert * Copartisan			0.033 (0.462)	0.027 (0.462)
Expert * Opp. partisan			0.204 (0.469)	0.194 (0.468)
Constant	−0.230 (1.054)	−0.223 (1.069)	−0.181 (1.066)	−0.180 (1.081)
Observations	908	908	908	908

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Democrats

Study 1

In Study 1, Democratic respondents evince the same basic pattern as their Republican colleagues. Analysis reveals a strong main effect of the expertise manipulation, indicating that Democratic respondents found expert sources to be more persuasive than novice sources across both issues. The interaction between the expertise and partisan cue reveals appears to be null in both circumstances. This may potentially suggest that Republicans held stronger copartisan biases, rewarding copartisan experts over a opposing partisan experts to a greater degree than their Democratic counterparts. However, I believe that such a claim would require far more analysis and is tangential to the goals of this study.

Table 13: The Effect of Expertise on Perceived Argument Strength (Democratic Respondents)

	<i>Dependent variable: Difference in Perceived Argument Strength (Pro Author - Con Author)</i>							
	GMO Labels (G)				Automatic Voter Registration (A)			
	(G1)	(G2)	(G3)	(G4)	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)
Expert pro author	0.546** (0.148)	0.604** (0.224)	0.547** (0.149)	0.604** (0.224)	0.280 (0.144)	0.418* (0.196)	0.281 (0.144)	0.416* (0.196)
Copartisan author	-0.008 (0.150)	-0.059 (0.210)	-0.009 (0.150)	-0.059 (0.210)	0.603** (0.144)	0.483* (0.196)	0.593** (0.144)	0.474* (0.196)
Expert * Copartisan		0.104 (0.299)		0.101 (0.300)		0.262 (0.289)		0.258 (0.288)
Partisan extremity			0.057 (0.109)	0.056 (0.110)			-0.215* (0.106)	-0.214* (0.106)
Constant	0.412** (0.136)	0.382* (0.161)	0.300 (0.254)	0.272 (0.267)	1.150** (0.124)	1.086** (0.143)	1.558** (0.236)	1.494** (0.247)
Observations	616	616	616	616	621	621	621	621
Adjusted R ²	0.018	0.017	0.017	0.016	0.031	0.030	0.036	0.035

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Study 2

In Study 2, Democratic respondents again show the same basic pattern as their Republican colleagues. Analysis yields a strong, statistically significant main effect of the expertise cue when accounting for all other relevant variables. This indicates that respondents were far more likely to select articles written by experts than those written by non-experts, all else held equal.

Table 14: The Effect of Expertise and Partisanship on News Article Selection (Democratic Respondents)

	<i>Dependent variable: Selected the Pro Policy Argument</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expert pro author	0.827** (0.118)	0.831** (0.119)	0.973** (0.204)	0.961** (0.205)
Copartisan pro author	0.622** (0.146)	0.686** (0.251)	0.666** (0.209)	0.718* (0.292)
Opposing partisan pro author	-0.259 (0.144)	-0.174 (0.252)	-0.071 (0.210)	-0.015 (0.291)
Counter-attitudinal		-0.579* (0.228)		-0.582* (0.229)
Pro-attitudinal		0.368 (0.230)		0.367 (0.230)
Counter-stereotypic		-0.024 (0.295)		-0.016 (0.296)
Stereotypic		-0.121 (0.296)		-0.107 (0.296)
Expert * Copartisan			-0.078 (0.289)	-0.069 (0.291)
Expert * Opp. partisan			-0.360 (0.291)	-0.320 (0.293)
Constant	0.672 (1.294)	0.960 (1.304)	0.601 (1.308)	0.903 (1.318)
Observations	2,668	2,668	2,668	2,668

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01