

**Sanctioned to Death? The Impact of Economic Sanctions
on Life Expectancy and its Gender Gap
— Online Appendix —**

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Table A1: Variable Definitions and Sources

Distance from US. Distance of the target country's capital from Washington, DC in 1,000 kilometers. *Source:* Gleditsch & Ward (2001).

Globalization. Total globalization as measured by the KOF Globalization Index. *Source:* Dreher (2006).

Human Rights Violations. Terror scale measuring physical integrity rights violations based on US State Department ratings; ranges from 1 (lowest value) to 5 (highest value). *Source:* Political Terror Scale.

Life Expectancy. Average number of years a group of people born in the same year can be expected to live if mortality at each age remains constant in the future. *Source:* US Census Bureau (2013).

Log Off. Dev. Ass./Capita. Natural log plus one-transformation of net official development assistance per capita. *Source:* World Bank.

Log Population. Natural logarithm of total population size. *Source:* United Nations.

Log Real GDP/Capita. Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in 2005 US dollars. *Source:* United Nations.

Major Conflicts. Interstate armed conflict or internal armed conflict with or without intervention from other states resulting in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year. *Source:* Gleditsch et al. (2002).

Minor Conflicts. Interstate armed conflict or internal armed conflict with or without intervention from other states resulting in between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year. *Source:* Gleditsch et al. (2002).

Polity2. Democracy indicator that ranges from strongly democratic (+10) to strongly autocratic (−10). *Source:* Marshall et al. (2016).

Population Growth. First difference of natural logarithm of total population size. *Source:* United Nations.

Real GDP/Capita Growth. First difference of natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in 2005 US dollars. *Source:* United Nations.

Rural Population. Ratio of people living in rural areas as percentage of total population. *Source:* World Bank.

Sanctions. As defined in Table 1. *Source:* Wood (2008), Hufbauer et al. (2009), Neuenkirch & Neumeier (2015).

Schooling. Average years of total schooling for people of age 15 and older. Missing country-year observations are linearly interpolated. *Source:* Barro and Lee (2013).

Table A2: List of Countries in Sample

<p> Afghanistan (12/2/15.58), Albania (23/0/0.10), Algeria (25/0/1.18), Argentina (29/0/1.24), Armenia (21/0/1.45), Bahrain (24/0/0.30), Bangladesh (31/0/5.10), Benin (33/0/4.89), Bolivia (20/0/1.10), Botswana (31/0/0.04), Brazil (35/7/9.85), Burma (36/25/4.21), Burundi (33/0/11.91), Cambodia (25/9/2.35), Cameroon (36/7/9.30), Central African Republic (29/3/19.69), Chile (22/0/0.25), China (12/0/1.02), Colombia (36/3/5.23), Congo, Dem. Rep. (36/18/25.98), Congo, Rep. (35/0/5.34), Costa Rica (28/0/0.03), Croatia (16/0/0.07), Cuba (12/0/0.79), Cyprus (13/0/0.00), Dominican Rep. (32/0/0.42), Ecuador (22/5/0.35), Egypt (15/0/0.66), El Salvador (19/0/0.36), Fiji (21/7/0.01), Gabon (36/0/1.49), Gambia (29/5/5.31), Ghana (36/0/2.14), Guatemala (12/0/0.15), Guyana (32/0/0.03), Haiti (36/18/4.73), Honduras (36/1/0.34), India (21/3/1.73), Indonesia (32/9/1.42), Israel (14/0/0.04), Jamaica (30/0/0.02), Jordan (18/0/0.53), Kazakhstan (21/0/3.21), Kenya (33/4/1.54), Kuwait (6/0/0.05), Kyrgyzstan (20/0/0.78), Laos (17/0/4.74), Lesotho (36/0/0.09), Liberia (36/21/8.01), Libya (7/1/0.24), Malawi (34/2/1.61), Malaysia (32/0/0.10), Mali (35/0/3.22), Mauritania (35/0/15.66), Mauritius (29/0/0.03), Mexico (32/0/1.58), Moldova (15/0/0.06), Mongolia (22/0/0.72), Morocco (30/0/3.88), Mozambique (32/0/13.14), Namibia (22/0/0.02), Nepal (36/0/2.09), Nicaragua (36/18/0.41), Niger (35/5/2.45), Pakistan (12/0/1.46), Panama (32/4/0.04), Papua New Guinea (30/0/0.23), Paraguay (36/6/0.68), Peru (31/5/0.89), Philippines (32/0/1.07), Qatar (10/0/0.03), Rwanda (31/15/0.80), Saudi Arabia (16/0/1.10), Senegal (36/0/2.98), Serbia (11/0/0.01), Sierra Leone (36/14/13.40), Singapore (6/0/0.02), Slovenia (7/0/0.00), South Africa (18/0/0.19), South Korea (10/0/0.45), Sri Lanka (14/0/0.03), Swaziland (36/0/0.14), Syria (31/27/0.51), Tajikistan (20/0/2.58), Thailand (22/2/0.10), Togo (31/0/8.43), Trinidad and Tobago (31/0/0.00), Tunisia (26/0/0.88), Turkey (32/0/0.29), Uganda (33/0/6.73), Ukraine (7/0/0.42), United Arab Emirates (10/0/0.04), Uruguay (28/0/0.23), Venezuela (22/0/4.90), Vietnam (14/0/1.10), Yemen (15/0/2.63), Zambia (32/3/1.87), Zimbabwe (30/17/1.40) </p>
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Notes: First figure in parentheses is the number of total observations for a country; second figure indicates the number of years with sanctions against that country; third figure denotes the number of observations of a country in the weighted control group.

Table A3: The Impact of Sanctions on Life Expectancy: Effect Heterogeneity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	$\Delta(\text{LE M})$	$\Delta(\text{LE W})$	$\Delta(\text{LE M})$	$\Delta(\text{LE W})$	$\Delta(\text{LE M})$	$\Delta(\text{LE W})$	$\Delta(\text{LE M})$	$\Delta(\text{LE W})$	$\Delta(\text{LE M})$	$\Delta(\text{LE W})$
UN Sanctions	-0.28 (0.40)	-0.56 (0.42)	-1.16*** (0.40)	-1.49*** (0.42)	-1.01*** (0.36)	-1.32*** (0.38)	-1.39*** (0.46)	-1.53*** (0.48)	-0.78** (0.37)	-1.08*** (0.39)
... Years	-0.31*** (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.05)								
... Moderate/Severe			-0.30 (0.48)	-0.10 (0.51)						
... Costs to Target					-0.02 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)				
... Targeted Sanctions							0.37 (0.48)	0.15 (0.51)		
... Political Environment									0.30 (0.20)	0.37* (0.21)
US Sanctions	-0.01 (0.23)	-0.20 (0.24)	-0.55** (0.23)	-0.59** (0.24)	-0.36* (0.22)	-0.44* (0.23)	-0.39* (0.21)	-0.47** (0.23)	-0.29 (0.21)	-0.40* (0.22)
... Years	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)								
... Moderate/Severe			0.52* (0.30)	0.41 (0.31)						
... Costs to Target					-0.08* (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)				
... Political Environment									0.62*** (0.15)	0.42** (0.16)
R ²	0.31	0.28	0.30	0.28	0.30	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.30	0.28
Weighted Observations	532	532	532	532	532	532	532	532	532	532
Error Term Correlation	0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99	
Test for Independence	2419.8***		2419.3***		2419.2***		2419.1***		2420.9***	

Notes: Average treatment effect on the treated obtained by seemingly unrelated weighted least squares regression with standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and year-fixed effects and the set of matching covariates as control variables. US sanctions are not interacted with an indicator for targeted sanctions, as we do not have data on targeted sanctions by the US. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.

Table A4: The Impact of Sanctions on Life Expectancy: Distance from the United States

	(1) $\Delta(\text{LE Men})$	(2) $\Delta(\text{LE Women})$
UN Sanctions	-1.10*** (0.35)	-1.37*** (0.37)
US Sanctions	-1.84*** (0.54)	-2.04*** (0.57)
... Distance to Wash. DC	0.16*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.06)
R ²	0.30	0.28
Weighted Observations	532	532
Error Term Correlation (1) and (2)		0.99
Test for Independence (1) and (2)		2,418.7***

Notes: Average treatment effect on the treated obtained by seemingly unrelated weighted least squares regression with standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and year-fixed effects and the set of matching covariates as control variables. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.

Figure A1: Frequency of Sanction Duration by Type of Sanction




Figure A2: Frequency of Distances from the United States for Observations Subject to US Sanctions

