**Appendix I: Allern et al.’s index of Social democratic party-union ties**

Allern et al. (2017) developed an index to measure the strength of Social democratic party-union ties – our central explanatory variable. Based on different indicators of organizational linkages, Figure 1 shows the combined scores of party-union ties across parties’ central organization and legislative party group in 12 advanced capitalist countries. Drawing on codings from country experts, it distinguishes between a ‘traditional ally’ – i.e. a union confederation or union that has been known for a close relationship with a left-of-center party – and ‘other allies’. The most intimate relationships between ‘traditional allies’ are to be found in the UK, Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland. When it comes to links of major left-of-center parties and ‘other’ union confederations, we see the highest scores in Finland, Austria, and Switzerland. Combining the numbers from ‘traditional’ and ‘other’ allies, the highest scores can be found in Finland, followed by Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, and the UK.

Figure 1: Total link scores of party-trade union relationships: the major left-of-center party and its traditional union ally/allies compared to the major left-of-center party and other unions, by country. Source: Allern et al. 2017, p. 295 (Figure 15.9.).

With the selection of Austria and Denmark, and the two additional cases of Sweden and Germany, we include two high-level and two low-level cases: Austria and Sweden feature strong party-union ties, whereas Denmark and Germany no longer do. There are, however, two caveats in the interpretation of the ranking described above. First, and most obviously, the index does not include one of our cases, namely Denmark. Yet, drawing on Allern et al. (2007), party-union ties in Denmark have become “quite distant” over time. In 1995-96, the Social democratic party and the Confederation of Danish Trade Unions (LO-Denmark) decided respectively to abolish mutual representation in each other’s governing bodies (Bille 1998). In 2002, LO-Denmark decided furthermore to suspend its annual financial contribution to the party and removed any reference to the Social democratic party in its constitution after more than 130 years of unity. The other two union confederations have emphasized non-partisanship ever since. Denmark is thus a case of party-union ties that have weakened significantly since at least the 1980s (Allern et al. 2007).

Second, the index displays a medium score in the relationship between the Austrian Social democratic party (SPÖ) and its traditional union ally, PRO-GE (manufacturing), and a high score in the party’s relationship to its other union ally, GPA-djp (private service sector). However, it does not measure the relationship between the SPÖ and the peak union confederation ÖGB, as Austria’s ‘far from unitary structure of unions complicates the assessment of links’ (Allern et al. 2017, 285). It therefore misses the dominance of the Social democratic faction (FSG, *Fraktion Sozialdemokratarischer Gewerkschafter*) in the union confederation as a functional equivalent of party–union links. Given the political composition of the labor movement, ‘[t]here are enduring, extensive, and intensive party–union links that make Austria different’, including ‘overlapping structures, inter-organizational links that are reciprocal and durable, as well as many others that are occasional’ (Luther 2017, 91). Despite these two case-specific limitations, the index provides a comparative perspective on the degree of party-union ties, which helps to evaluate our claim beyond the cases of Austria and Denmark.

# Appendix II: Secondary case-studies – extended versions.

The radical right party of *Sweden*, the Sweden Democrats (SD), developed an attack-oriented institutional strategy comparable to the one developed by the Austrian FPÖ. This is *despite* the absence of an Austrian-style party cartel characterized by party patronage, whereas party-union ties are similarly strong in Sweden (see Figure 1 in Appendix). After several unsuccessful campaigns, the SD achieved parliamentary representation in 2010 with 5.7 percent of the votes. The party increased its vote share to 12.9 percent in 2014, climbing even further to 17.6 percent in 2018 to become the third largest party in the Swedish parliament.

Like in Denmark, Ghent-organized unemployment funds and corporatist decision-making in the implementation of Swedish labor market policies are strong institutional assets of the Social Democratic labor movement (Rothstein 1992; 1996; Svensson 2001, 124-125). SD have launched repeated attacks on the Ghent-model and instigated predictable conflicts with the Social democratic party (SAP) and LO-Sweden. In contrast to the pragmatic attitude of the DF towards the Danish Ghent system, the SD in Sweden proposed to replace the Ghent-model with a public option financed out of general taxes in 2010 (Sverigedemokraterna 2010). The proposal was put forward in the 2018 election manifesto alongside an additional proposal to dismantle the public employment service (Sverigedemokraterna 2018: 10), converted into legislative initiatives in 2019 and presented before the permanent parliamentary committee for labor market policy. As expected, they went nowhere and were rejected by a majority led by the Social Democrats (Sveriges Riksdag: Motion till riksdagen 2019/20:811).

Attacks from the SD on institutional assets of the trade unions have been retaliated (LO 2019). LO-Sweden adopted in 2008 the resolution that being elected as a representative in a union under the confederation was incompatible with holding a membership of the SD. A survey among union leaders showed that the policy was maintained and supported in 2018 (Kindbom 2018) – even though an increasing number of union members voted for the SD and turned away from the Social Democratic party. In other words, while the SD attacked labor union assets, the labor unions efficiently closed off possibilities for the SD to gain a platform within existing power structures.

The growing electoral appeal – and success – of the SD among working-class voters did not soften-up the LO-leadership. Quite the contrary. After the 2018 election, LO and the Social democratic party committed to a strategy to strengthen the party-union partnership before the elections in 2022 and 2026 – including such elements as recruitment of union members into the party organization, active cooperation and assistance from LO-personnel in election campaigns, continued commitment to financing the Social democratic party, and the hiring of a political strategist by the Social Democratic party to realize the strategy (Aktuellt i Politiken 2019; Aftonbladet 2019; LO 2019). In other words, there are no signs of cracks in the cooperation between the party and union in the Swedish labor movement, and the SD responded with theoretically expected proposals to radically reform institutional structures on which the Social Democratic movement have thrived politically. So far unsuccessfully.

As in Sweden, *Germany* has experienced the emergence of a radical right party during the 2010s: the AfD. Having entered parliament in 2013, it almost tripled its vote share up to 13 percent in the 2017 general election. Unlike the SD, the AfD’s strategy lacks a clear agenda, which resembles what we have observed in the case of Denmark. Although any conclusions drawn from the AfD should be treated with caution as it is still a party in the making, existing party manifestoes and parliamentary initiatives suggests that it cares little about institutional reform.

We attribute this lack of agency to the fact that the AfD can gain much less from institutional reforms than their counterparts in Sweden. Social democratic party-union ties eroded with the SPD’s legislation of the union-hostile Hartz reforms in the mid-2000s (see Figure 1 in Appendix). Trade union representatives thus advocate for ‘situational coalitions with any partner willing to cooperate – and not only with the SPD and Die Linke, but also with the CDU/CSU and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen – in order to maximize their direct or indirect influence on policymaking’ (Spier 2017, 147).

The AfD originally started as a market-liberal protest party opposing the bailout packages devised for peripheral Eurozone countries that were hit hardest by the financial-*cum*-fiscal crisis in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Hence, its ultimate goal was to leave the Eurozone as a way off liberating Germany from fiscal risk-sharing arrangements. A draft version of the 2016 party manifesto included market-liberal demands on labor market reform too, especially the privatization of unemployment protection and a detailed institutional overhaul of labor market policy that would have put an end to corporatist self-administration (AfD 2016a, 37). Unlike in Sweden, the initially radical demands on institutional reform were overall consistent with an economic right-wing agenda. The final version removed the demand for the privatization of unemployment protection.

However, the 2017 election manifesto lacked any demand for an institutional reform of labor market administration (AfD 2017). Since 2016, more generally, we can observe an intensification of internal splits between the party’s ethno-nationalist pro-welfare wing under Björn Höcke on the one hand, and its moderate market-liberal wing under Jörg Meuthen on the other (TAZ, 20.04.2016). This conflict helps explain why the 2019 party manifesto toned down its market-liberal agenda. In the area of labor market reform, the only demand the 2019 manifesto retained from 2016 is to delegate responsibility over the unemployment insurance from the Federal Employment Service (*Bundesagentur für Arbeit*) to the municipal job-centers that are currently in charge of social assistance claimants (AfD 2019, 70). We could not find a public statement from the AfD that describes the motivations and intentions behind this demand (our interview request was declined). Although its implementation would remove institutional power from corporatist interest groups, both employer and union representatives also refrained from making public statements on this issue.

In an interview with one of the authors, a representative of the Federal Employment agency noted that in informal meetings and regular hearings the AfD does not “touch upon” the issue and lacks “any engagement” on labor market administration (Interview VI). This description is consistent with the fact that it has not voiced any demands for institutional reforms in parliament. In the current legislative period since 2017, the AfD initiated three parliamentary reform proposals; none of them would have changed the administrative architecture of labor market policy. It proposed to (1) link the maximum duration of unemployment benefit receipt to the individual contribution record of a job seeker (BT-Drucksache 2019), (2) clarify the conditions of temporary employment (BT-Drucksache 2018a), and (3) postpone the retirement age for the long-term unemployed (BT-Drucksache 2018b).

The programmatic trajectory and parliamentary activities suggest that the AfD places little emphasis on institutional reforms, which contrasts sharply with the direct confrontation observed between the unions and the radical right in Sweden. Whereas the Sweden Democrats use the issue of labor market administration in order to attack institutional union power, the AfD faces an environment, in which the SPD and the unions are more distant than ever in the post-war era. Our secondary cases of Germany and Sweden thus buttress the argument that the strength of Social democratic party-union ties is crucial in order to understand the diverse impact of radical right parties on trade unions.

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# Appendix IV: Documentation of interviews

A first phase of three interviews was conducted in 2006 in the framework of a previous project on institutional reform in Denmark and a second phase was conducted in 2017 specifically with FPÖ representatives in Austria. As the German AfD has voiced almost no public statements on institutional reform, we interviewed a peak representative of the German Federal Employment Agency to gain insights into the role of AfD officials in informal meetings on institutional labor market reform (interview requests were rejected by AfD representatives). In the cases of Austria and Denmark, the number of interviews was determined by saturation.

Interview I: Ewald Stadler, MP Austrian Freedom Party, member of the FPÖ’s federal executive committee from 1994 to 1999 and member of the party’s drafting committee of the 1997 program, August 24th 2017 (recorded on tape).

Interview II: Lothar Höbelt, collaborator of the FPÖ’s Vice Chancellor, Susanne Riess-Passer, and member of the party’s drafting committee of the 1997 programme, August 26th 2017 (recorded on tape).

Interview III: Jan Petersen, former MP Social Democratic party, May 24th 2007 (recorded on tape).

Interview IV: Bent Bøgsted, MP Danish Peoples Party, November 30th 2005 (recorded on tape).

Interview V: Kristian Thulesen Dahl, MP and present chairman of Danish Peoples Party, March 20th 2006 (recorded on tape).

Interview VI: Representative of Federal Employment Agency of Germany, February 11th 2020 (telephone interview).